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Minimalism at War 
 
Cass R. Sunstein
* 
 
 
“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the 
necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations. . . 
. This Court has . . . held that the President has constitutional authority to protect the national 
security and that this authority carries with it broad discretion. . . . [I]t is crucial to recognize that 
judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a 
unitary Executive.”
1 
 
“The Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime President.”
2 
 
“More importantly, the search for alternatives helps avoid two extreme positions. The first 
says that, insofar as war is concerned, the Constitution does not really matter. That is wrong. The 
Constitution always matters, perhaps particularly so in times of emergency. The second says that, 
insofar as the Constitution is concerned, war or security emergencies do not really matter. That is 
wrong too. Security needs may well matter, playing a major role in determining just where the 
proper constitutional balance lies.”
3 
 
I. Introduction 
 
  Many judges are minimalists; they want to say and do no more than necessary to 
resolve cases.
4 Judicial minimalism leads in two different directions. First, minimalists 
favor shallowness over depth, in the sense they seek to avoid taking stands on the most 
deeply contested questions of constitutional law. They attempt to reach incompletely 
theorized agreements, in which the most fundamental questions are left undecided. They 
prefer outcomes and opinions that can attract support from people with a wide range of 
theoretical positions, or with uncertainty about which theoretical positions are best. In 
these ways, minimalist judges avoid the largest questions about the meaning of the free 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jack Goldsmith, Richard Posner, Adam Samaha, Geoffrey Stone, 
David Strauss, and Adrian Vermeule for extremely helpful comments on a previous draft. 
1 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633, 2675-76 (2004) (Thomas dissenting) 
2 Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 219 (Doubleday 1962). 
3 Stephen Breyer, Liberty, Security, and the Courts (April 14, 2003), online at  
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html (visited Dec 1, 2004) 
4 Minimalism is discussed in general terms in Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism 
on the Supreme Court (Harvard 1999). speech guarantee, or the extent of the Constitution’s protection of “liberty,” or the precise 
scope of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 
Second, minimalists favor narrowness over width. Proceeding one case at a time, 
they seek decisions that resolve the problem at hand without also resolving a series of 
other problems that might have relevant differences. In the fashion of common law 
courts, minimalist judges prefer to focus on the particular question at issue, refusing to 
venture broader judgments that might turn out, on reflection, to be unwarranted.
5 With 
their emphasis on shallowness and narrowness, some minimalists have a particular 
preference for democracy-promoting decisions, certainly as compared to decisions that 
simply invalidate what government proposes to do. Democracy-promoting decisions are 
those that lead to explicit judgments by democratically accountable actors, above all 
Congress.
6  
  Many judges distrust minimalism and prefer maximalism.
7  Maximalists reject 
shallowness in favor of depth. They are committed to a large-scale theory about the 
foundations of constitutional law. They might believe that “originalism” is the best theory 
of constitutional meaning, or they might think that the document should be interpreted to 
ensure the appropriate operation of democracy itself.
8 Typically they believe that their 
own theory is correct and that it reflects the right kind of judicial modesty (or, as the case 
may be, aggressiveness). What matters is that maximalists want to adopt a foundational 
account of one or another kind.  
  In the same vein, maximalists reject narrowness in favor of width. They believe 
that narrow rulings leave a great deal of unpredictability and also promote judicial 
discretion.
9 They think that firm, clear rules, laid down in advance, are the best way of 
                                                 
5 See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 80 (Harvard 2003): “The pragmatic judge 
tends to favor narrow over broad grounds of decision in the early stages in the development of a legal 
doctrine. . . . What the judge has before him is the facts of the particular case, not the facts of future cases. 
He can try to imagine what those cases will be like, but the likelihood of error in such an imaginative 
projection is great. Working outward, in stages, from the facts before him to future cases with new facts 
that may suggest the desirability of altering the contours of the applicable rules, the judge avoids premature 
generalization.” 
6 This point is elaborated in Sunstein at pp. 26-39 (cited in note 4). 
7 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton 1997). 
8 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard 1983). 
9 For an argument in favor of width, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L 
Rev 115 (1989); the best general treatment is Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 NYU L Rev 74 
(2000) 
2 ensuring clarity for the future—and also of simultaneously constraining and emboldening 
judges, encouraging them to protect liberty when the stakes are highest.
10 They add that 
such rules provide a highly visible background against which other branches of 
government can do their work.
11  
  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have raised fresh questions about the 
places of minimalism and maximalism in American constitutional law. Those questions 
are especially pressing in the face of conflicts between national security and claimed 
violations of constitutional rights. Perhaps a form of minimalism makes particular sense 
for the resolution of such conflicts; perhaps some kind of maximalism is much better. In 
fact we can readily imagine two stylized positions: National Security Maximalism and 
Liberty Maximalism.
12 National Security Maximalists understand the Constitution to call 
for a highly deferential role for the judiciary, above all on the ground that when national 
security is threatened, the President must be permitted to do what needs to be done to 
protect the country. If he cannot provide that protection, who will? By contrast, Liberty 
Maximalists insist that in times of war, at least as much as in times of peace, federal 
judges must protect constitutional liberty.
13 Indeed, Liberty Maximalists believe that 
under circumstances of war, it is all the more important that federal judges take a strong 
stand on behalf of liberty.
14 If they do not, who will?  
                                                 
10 Scalia, at 119 (cited in note 9). 
11 See id. 
12 For excellent and related discussions from which I have learned a great deal, see Eric A. Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan L Rev 605 (2003); Richard Pildes and Samuel 
Issacharoff, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach 
to Right During Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (Online Edition) No 1, Article 1 (Jan 2004), 
online at  
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol5/iss1/art1 (visited Dec 1, 2004). National Security Maximalism is 
an extreme version of what Posner and Vermeule call the accommodationist view; Liberty Maximalism is 
akin to what they deem the strict enforcement view. Their target is the civil libertarian concern that 
accommodationist rulings will weaken liberty during peacetime and that during emergencies, the 
government will respond to unjustified public panic. Like Posner and Vermeule, I reject the strict 
enforcement view, and for reasons that overlap with theirs. National Security Maximalists are what Pildes 
and Issacharoff call Executive Unilateralists; Liberty Maximalists are what Pildes and Issacharoff call Civil 
Libertarians. Like Pildes and Issacharoff, and borrowing from their discussion, I stress the use of clear 
statement principles. 
13 See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on 
Terrorism (WW Norton 2003). 
14 This is one reading of Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act 
of 1798 to the War on Terrorism (WW Norton 2004). 
3 Of course some people reject both maximalism and minimalism in favor of an 
intermediate approach. They might, for example, err in the direction of presidential 
power without accepting National Security Maximalism, or err in the direction of 
freedom without accepting Liberty Maximalism. But an emphasis on the two forms of 
maximalism is helpful for analytic purposes; by exploring the poles, we can have a 
clearer sense of what might be wrong with more cautious versions as well. In addition, 
the poles have considerable appeal—National Security Maximalism to many federal 
judges as well as to the executive branch, Liberty Maximalism to many academic 
commentators as well as mission-oriented organizations focussed on the protection of 
freedom. As we shall see, unmistakable forms of National Security Maximalism, rather 
than an intermediate approach, can be found in several places in recent years. 
  This Article has two central purposes. The first is to reject both forms of 
maximalism and to specify and support a minimalist approach to intrusions on freedom 
amidst war. The second is to suggest that to a remarkable degree, an identifiable form of 
minimalism captures the practices of the American courts when national security is 
threatened.
15 Prominent uses of minimalism can be found during the Civil War, World 
War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the contemporary war on terrorism. In general, 
the Supreme Court has adopted a form of minimalism having three central components: a 
requirement of clear congressional authorization for executive action intruding on 
interests with a claim to constitutional protection
16; an insistence on fair hearings, 
including access to courts, for those deprived of liberty; and judicial decisions that are 
themselves shallow and narrow and that therefore impose modest constraints on the 
future. The minimalist pattern unifies an extraordinary number of seemingly disparate 
decisions, including those in the recent past.
17 Indeed, the Court’s notorious decisions 
involving the exclusion and detention of Japanese-Americans during World War II 
should be seen not as blind deference to executive power, but as a tribute to 
                                                 
15 An important aspect of minimalism, requiring congressional authorization, is traced in some detail in 
Pildes and Issacharoff, Civil Libertarianism (cited in note xx). 
16 The notion of authorization raises a number of complexities, on which see Curtis Bradley and Jack 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, Harv L Rev (forthcoming 2005); I deal 
with some of those complexities below, see TAN infra. 
17 See Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004); Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633 (2004). 
4 minimalism—requiring clear congressional support for deprivations of liberty by the 
executive, and permitting those deprivations only if that support can be found.
18 
The Court’s own practices help to identify serious problems with both forms of 
maximalism. If the nation is genuinely threatened, Liberty Maximalism runs into two 
difficulties. First, it is unrealistic, certainly in its most ambitious forms; judges simply 
will not protect liberty with the same aggressiveness when a country faces a serious threat 
to its survival.
19 By itself this is a large objection to Liberty Maximalism. “Ought implies 
can,” and it is unhelpful to urge courts to adopt a role that they will predictably refuse to 
assume.
20 Second, Liberty Maximalism is undesirable. The government’s power to 
intrude on liberty depends on the strength of the justifications it can muster on behalf of 
the intrusion.
21 When security is at risk, government has greater justifications than when 
it is not. Hence it is correct to say, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, that it “is neither 
desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in 
wartime as it does in peacetime.”
22  
None of this means that in times of war, the government may proceed however it 
wishes or act in blatant violation of constitutional commands. Interferences with freedom 
of speech, for example, should be regarded with great skepticism, simply because they 
eliminate the principal method by which democracies correct themselves.
23 As we shall 
see, courts do, and should, take steps to ensure against arbitrary detentions. In American 
                                                 
18 See below. 
19 See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War (unpublished manuscript 2003) (offering 
quantitative study of judicial deference during war); William Rehnquist, All the Laws But One (Knopf 
1998). 
20 Of course I am using the term “can” to suggest willingness, rather than feasibility. There is nothing in the 
structure of the universe that would prevent courts from adopting Liberty Maximalism, and hence “can” 
operates, in this context, in a relatively weak sense. There is no point in asking courts to assume a posture 
that they will predictably refuse. 
21 See Breyer, Liberty at 3 (cited in note xx): “The value does not change; the circumstances change, 
thereby shifting the point at which a proper balance is struck. That is what happens in wartime when more 
severe restrictions may be required.” 
22 Id at 224-25. 
23 See Stone, Perilous Times, (cited in note 14); see also Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a 
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv L Rev 16, 149 (2002): “[M]atters of daily life constantly test 
judges’ ability to protect democracy, but judges meet their supreme test in situations of war and terrorism. 
The protection of every individual’s human rights is a much more formidable duty in times of war and 
terrorism than in times of peace and security. . . . As a Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, how should I 
view my role in protecting human rights given this situation? I must take human rights seriously during 
times of both peace and conflict.”  
5 law, it cannot be said that “inter arma silent leges” (amidst war laws are silent).
24 But as a 
general approach for courts in wartime, Liberty Maximalism is a nonstarter. It is too 
broad, and too neglectful of legitimate government interests, to have a serious claim to 
our attention. 
But its principal competitor, National Security Maximalism, runs into serious 
problems as well. First, its reading of the Constitution, typically emphasizing the 
President’s role as Commander in Chief, is tendentious; some of the document’s 
provisions can be taken to support National Security Maximalism, but they need not be 
read in that fashion. In fact they are more plausibly seen to ensure a shared division of 
authority between the President and Congress, above all because they retain the role of 
Congress as the nation’s lawmaker. Second, National Security Maximalism neglects the 
fact that under many circumstances, the executive branch is most unlikely to strike the 
right balance between security and liberty.
25 A primary task of the President is to keep the 
citizenry safe, and any error on that count is likely to produce extremely high political 
sanctions. For this reason, the President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if 
they are excessive and even unconstitutional. Internal deliberations within the executive 
branch are more likely than not to aggravate the problem, leading not to sensible checks 
and balances, but to a tendency toward a degree of extremism.  
Of course unjustified intrusions on liberty can and do produce political retribution 
as well. But whether they do so depends on their incidence; and here is a further problem 
for National Security Maximalism. Political safeguards are most reliable if the intrusions 
severely burden many people at once. Such general intrusions are unlikely to be tolerated 
unless citizens can be convinced that they are necessary. But if the intrusions are faced by 
an identifiable few, political checks will not ensure that they are justified. On the 
contrary, political pressures might well favor them even if they are not. 
In some circumstances, then, the executive is likely to adopt steps that sacrifice 
liberty for no adequate reason.
26 But judicial intervention is no panacea, for courts have 
institutional weaknesses of their own. Worst of all, they lack relevant information and 
                                                 
24 Cicero, Oratio Pro Annio Milone IV; see Rehnquist, All the Laws at 224 (cited in note xx). 
25 For countless examples, see Stone, Perlious Times (cited in note 14). 
26 See id; Epstein et al., Supreme Silence (cited in note xx); and Rehnquist, All the Laws (cited in note xx), 
for many illustrations. 
6 hence they may not know whether an interference with liberty is actually justified. 
Because their historic mission is to protect individual liberty, they may give insufficient 
attention to the variables on the other side.
27 But none of this means that courts cannot 
play a productive role. I investigate here three ingredients of a minimalist approach that 
seems to me to have significant promise, and to represent a distillation of much of the 
practice of American courts over the last century and more: 
1. Clear congressional authorization. Courts should require clear congressional 
authorization before the executive intrudes on interests that have a strong claim to 
constitutional protection.
28 As a general rule, the executive should not be permitted to act 
on its own.
29 The underlying ideas here are twofold: a requirement of congressional 
authorization provides a check on unjustified intrusions on liberty, and such authorization 
is likely to be forthcoming when there is a good argument for it. A requirement of clear 
authorization therefore promotes liberty without compromising legitimate security 
interests.
30  
2. Hearing rights. Courts should insist, whenever possible, on the core principle 
of the due process clause: Before anyone is deprived of liberty, some kind of procedure 
must be put in place to ensure against erroneous deprivations. This requirement protects 
                                                 
27 Notably, however, there appears to be no evidence of judicial overprotection of civil liberties in the 
nation’s long history. See Stone, Perilous Times (cited in note 14). Compare the use of the Precautionary 
Principle in environmental regulation, which calls for margins of safety to protect against harmful 
outcomes. See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (forthcoming 2005), for 
general discussion. When national security is in danger, governments officials are engaging in a form of 
risk management, and it should not be surprising to find that they often adopt a kind of Precautionary 
Principle. Stone, Perilous Times (cited in note xx), may be seen as a catalogue of instances in which 
something akin to that principle was employed to produce many unjustifiable intrusions on liberty; in this 
sense, it is a cousin to Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True: A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental, Health, and 
Safety Issues (Harvard 1995), which catalogues a number of cases in which unjustifiable steps were taken 
in response to imagined environmental concerns. 
28 An early version of this idea can be found in Masses Publishing Co v Patten, 244 F 535 (SDNY 1917), 
discussed below. 
29 Complexities emerge when the President’s inherent authority is plausibly involved. See Loving v United 
States, 517 US 748 (1996). 
30 I discuss below the complex question whether clear authorization is sufficient as well as necessary; the 
short version is that outside of the egregious cases, courts should ordinarily respect the shared views of 
Congress and the President.  
7 against unjustified imprisonment, which counts as the most serious infringement of civil 
liberty.
31  
3. Judicial self-discipline. Courts should discipline themselves through narrow, 
incompletely theorized decisions. Such decisions tend to ensure against dual risks: 
judicial overreaching, in the form of limits on executive power that will ultimately prove 
unjustified; and excessive judicial modesty, in the form of decisions that, in the heat of 
the moment, lead to large-scale intrusions on liberty.
32 When vindicating minimalist 
principle (2), for example, judges can refuse to specify the precise procedure that must be 
used, allowing the executive (for example) to use military tribunals or otherwise to depart 
from ordinary adjudicative procedures, so long as the rudiments of due process are 
observed. 
These three ideas can be unified under the general rubric of Due Process Writ 
Large. The requirement of congressional authorization provides a degree of procedural 
protection at the structural level. By mandating action from an institution that is both 
diverse and deliberative, that requirement offers a procedural safeguard against ill-
considered intrusions into the domain of liberty. The requirement of a minimal hearing 
reflects the most familiar aspect of the due process guarantee. The requirement of narrow 
and shallow rulings from the courts applies due process principles to judges themselves, 
by ensuring that those not before the court will be provided with an opportunity to be 
heard.  
All of these principles make sense not only for courts, but also for constitutional 
judgments within the executive branch and Congress in times of war. Judges are hardly 
the only people involved in constitutional interpretation. The executive branch, for 
example, would do well to seek congressional authorization for intrusions on 
constitutionally sensitive interests, to ensure hearings for those deprived of liberty, and to 
rely on narrow and incompletely theorized judgments about issues at the frontiers of 
constitutional law. 
                                                 
31 The hearing right is a modest one, because as I am understanding it here, it requires a proceeding only to 
determine whether the executive has deprived someone of liberty on the basis of facts that under relevant as 
a matter of existing law. 
32 See Epstein et al., Supreme Silence (cited in note xx), for details. 
8 Of course minimalism is not always the appropriate course for federal judges or 
for anyone else.
33 Predictability can be extremely important, and in some contexts 
minimalism cannot be tolerated, simply because it sacrifices rule of law values for no 
sufficient reason. And of course general principles cannot resolve concrete cases; 
everything turns on the particular intrusion and its underlying justification. Sometimes 
the President is constitutionally permitted to act on his own
34; sometimes hearings need 
not be held
35; sometimes judges should rule broadly. A committed minimalist will insist 
on these very points, contending that it is too ambitious to insist, all of the time, on 
congressional authorization, hearings, and narrow and incompletely theorized rulings. 
But when national security and liberty are in tension, the three principles provide the best 
general orientation. 
This remainder of this Article comes in three parts. Part II sketches the role of 
National Security Maximalism in the war on terror. It shows that in recent years, this way 
of proceeding has had a prominent place in the Department of Justice, the Supreme 
Court, and federal courts of appeals. Part III outlines the problems with National Security 
Maximalism, including its tendentious reading of the Constitution and its failure to 
appreciate the relevant incentives on the part of the executive branch. Part IV sketches 
the minimalist alternative, with its emphasis on clear statement principles, hearing rights, 
and narrow, shallow judicial judgments. 
 
II.  National Security Maximalism 
 
“We are now confronted by a profoundly disturbing trend in our national political life: the 
growing tendency of the judicial branch to inject itself into areas of executive action originally 
assigned to the discretion of the president. These encroachments include some of the most 
fundamental aspects of the president’s conduct of the war on terrorism.”
36 
 
“But the ‘law’ which this prisoner is convicted of disregarding is not found in an act of 
Congress, but in a military order. Neither the Act of Congress nor the Executive Order, nor both 
together, would afford a basis for this conviction. It rests on the orders of General Dewitt.”
37 
 
                                                 
33 See Vermeule, 75 NYU L Rev 74 (cited in note xx). 
34 See, for example, Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 US 763 (1950). 
35 See id. 
36 Attorney General John Ascroft, quoted in Terry Frieden, Ashcroft: “Activist” Judges Can Put Nation’s 
Security At Risk (Nov 12, 2004), available at  
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/12/ashcroft.judges/index.html (visited Dec 1, 2004). 
37 Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson dissenting). 
9 It should be unsurprising to find that in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, 
National Security Maximalism has obtained a great deal of support. To be sure, the 
Supreme Court has refused to accept it, at least thus far.
38 But the basic approach can be 
found in many places. 
 
A. The Department of Justice 
 
In recent years, the most visible moment for National Security Maximalism came 
from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, with its 2002 
memorandum on the legality of coerced interrogation.
39 The most remarkable aspect of 
the memorandum is its suggestion that as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the 
President of the United States has the inherent authority to torture suspected terrorists, so 
as to make it constitutionally unacceptable for Congress to ban the practice of torture.
40 
The Office of Legal Counsel emphasized that “the President enjoys complete discretion 
in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority and in conducting operations against 
hostile forces.”
41 In addition, the Office of Legal Counsel insisted that a core function of 
the Commander in Chief includes interrogation of the enemy.
42 Because of “the 
President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign against al 
Qaeda and its allies,” congressional enactments “must be construed as not applying to” 
interrogations undertaken as part of the President’s Commander in Chief authority.
43 
“Any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would 
violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the Commander in Chief authority in the 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S Ct 2633, 2674 (2004); Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004). 
39 See Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: 
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC 2340-2340A (August 1, 2002) (copy on file with 
author). This was the most visible moment for National Security Maximalism, but perhaps not the most 
extreme one. In the Padilla case, the President claimed that, as Commander in Chief, he had the inherent 
power to order military authorities to seize an American citizen in the United States without any judicial 
approval and to hold him indefinitely, incommunicado, with no access to a lawyer, a court, family, or 
friends, and without even informing his family or friends what they had done with him. I discuss Padilla 
below. 
40 Id at 31. 
41 Id at 33.  
42 Id at 38. 
43 Id at 34. To be sure, the position of the Department of Justice was stated with a degree of tentativeness, 
with the suggestion that the congressional ban on torture “might” be unconstitutional in the context of 
battlefield interrogations. So phrased, the suggestion is a form of minimalism, asking for avoidance of the 
constitutional issue by reading the statute so as not to intrude on the President’s authority as Commander in 
Chief. But the general impression is that the ban probably should be regarded as unconstitutional.  
10 President.”
44 Hence coercive interrogation, including torture, must be permitted if the 
President wants to engage in it. 
The Office of Legal Counsel is part of the executive branch, and one of its major 
functions is to protect the constitutional prerogatives of the President, especially those 
prerogatives that are associated with the Commander in Chief power. Generous 
interpretations of the President’s prerogatives should be expected from any office within 
the Department of Justice, above all when national security is at risk. But in its 
endorsement of presidential power, the memorandum on coerced interrogation went well 
beyond ordinary practice. To be sure, the President has inherent authority to oversee 
battlefield operations, and Congress has limited power to control such operations. The 
President also has the inherent authority to conduct interrogations amidst war. But to say 
the least, it is unusual to say that this authority includes the power to torture people when 
Congress has expressly said otherwise. The power to command the armed forces is not 
easily taken to include “inherent” power to torture enemy combatants. Even if it does 
include that power, it is hard to contend that Congress cannot provide protection against 
torture.
45  
Whatever one’s ultimate judgment on the merits, the memorandum of the Office 
of Legal Counsel provides a dramatic example of National Security Maximalism—one 
that may be taken to presage future understandings if that approach ultimately prevails. 
 
B. Justice Clarence Thomas in Hamdi 
 
In recent Supreme Court decisions involving the war on terrorism, National 
Security Maximalism failed to attract a majority opinion.
46 But it made a conspicuous 
appearance in a remarkable dissenting opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas in the Hamdi 
case.
47 I will turn to the particular facts of the case in due course. For the moment, note 
                                                 
44 Id at 39. 
45 See the discussion of Justice Jackson’s views in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579 
(1952) (“The Steel Seizure Case”), explored below. Note that in some applications, the Commander in 
Chief power is more plausibly read to include the power to torture – when, for example, torture is deemed 
necessary to prevent an imminent attack on American troops. But even here, Congress almost certainly has 
the authority to forbid the practice of torture. 
46 See Rasul, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004); Rumsfeld v Padilla, 124 S Ct 2711 (2004); Hamdi, 124 S Ct 2633 
(2004). 
47 Hamdi, 124 S Ct 2633, 2674 (2004). 
11 that Justice Thomas emphasized, very broadly, that any constitutional judgment in this 
domain should consider “basic principles of the constitutional structure as it relates to 
national security and foreign affairs.”
48 In his view, the Constitution accords to the 
President the “primary responsibility . . . to protect the national security and to conduct 
the nation’s foreign relations.”
49 Hence judicial judgments should be made against the 
backdrop set by the President’s inherent and broadly discretionary power to protect 
national security.
50  
 
With respect to the courts, Justice Thomas contended, “it is crucial to recognize 
that  judicial interference in these domains destroys the purpose of vesting primary 
responsibility in a unitary Executive.”
51 Judges “lack the relevant information and 
expertise to second-guess determinations made by the President . . . .”
52 In fact 
congressional grants of power should be construed generously on the President’s behalf, 
rather than narrowly, so as to fit with institutional limits on the power of the judiciary.
53 
Because the executive branch of the federal government “has an overriding interest in 
protecting the Nation,” it can invoke that interest to justify depriving people of liberty.
54 
In fact Justice Thomas argued in favor of broad constructions of congressional grants of 
authority partly to avoid constitutional difficulties: “Although the President very well 
may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops, I agree with the 
plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has authorized the 
President to do so.”
55 
Justice Thomas’ opinion is a form of National Security Maximalism because of its 
breadth and ambition. There is no effort here to offer a cautious ruling tailored to the 
facts of the particular case. On the contrary, Justice Thomas speaks generally about the 
“primary responsibility” of the President in the domain of “national security.” In addition, 
he adopts a kind of clear statement principle in favor of presidential authority, suggesting, 
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12 at least implicitly, that statutes should be read in a way that does not conflict with the 
President’s inherent authority. But from a reading of the Constitution alone, it would not 
be entirely clear whether the President or the Congress has primary responsibility in the 
domain of national security—an issue to which I will return. The important point is that 
Justice Thomas offers a distinctive vision of the constitutional structure, one that accords 
principal authority to the President and thus exemplifies National Security Maximalism. 
 
C. National Security Maximalism on the United States Court of Appeals: The President 
and “The War Power”  
 
In the years since the September 11 attacks, National Security Maximalism has 
played a large role on the lower federal courts.
56 Two circuits have decided most of the 
cases involving a conflict between national security and individual liberty: the United 
States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and for the Fourth Circuit. Both 
have shown a remarkable tendency toward National Security Maximalism. In nearly 
every case in which a serious challenge was mounted to the power of the President, the 
President has prevailed in the courts of appeals.
57 Let us investigate the details. 
1. The D.C. Circuit. One of the most strikingly maximalist decisions by the D.C. 
Circuit is Al Odah v United States,
58 reversed by the Supreme Court.
59 In its exceedingly 
ambitious ruling, the court held that aliens captured outside of the United States have no 
rights under the due process clause. The Court said that the Guantanamo Bay detainees 
were, in law, analogous to German prisoners captured on the battlefield in World War II. 
The court acknowledged that Guantanamo Bay is controlled by the United States 
military, but it insisted on the irrelevance of this fact because Cuba has sovereignty over 
                                                 
56 The principal exception is Padilla v Rumsfeld, 352 F3d 695 (2d Cir 2003), in which the Court held that 
the President could not detain Padilla because he lacked the inherent authority to do so and because 
Congress had not authorized the detention of American citizens on American soil. Id at 712-18, 722-23. 
This is an example of minimalism in action, as discussed below. 
57 The only significant exception is id. The evident influence of National Security Maximalism on the lower 
courts may attest to the reluctance of judges on those courts to reject security-related decisions by the 
President of the United States; perhaps the Supreme Court, by virtue of its unique position, is bound to be 
more cautious about embracing National Security Maximalism. 
58 321 F3d 1134 (DC Cir 2003). 
59 Rasul, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004). 
13 the area.
60 Broadly reading Supreme Court precedents, the Court ruled in favor of 
executive discretion.
61  
A concurring opinion by Judge Randolph (who wrote the majority opinion as 
well) went further still, resolving several issues that it was not necessary for him to 
discuss. Consider his confessedly maximalist opening sentence: “I write separately to add 
two other grounds for rejecting the detainee’s non-habeas claims.”
62 The fundamental 
motivation for his separate opinion seemed to be captured by his final sentence: “The 
level of threat a detainee poses to United States interests, the amount of intelligence a 
detainee might be able to provide, the conditions under which the detainee may be 
willing to cooperate, the disruption visits from family members and lawyers might 
cause—these types of judgments have traditionally been left to the exclusive discretion of 
the Executive Branch, and there they should remain.”
63 Here is an explicit endorsement 
of National Security Maximalism. 
Other rulings within the D.C. Circuit fall in the same category. In Center for 
National Security Studies v Department of Justice,
64 a divided court of appeals permitted 
an extraordinary level of secrecy from the executive branch. A number of public interest 
groups invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the common law, and the First 
Amendment to require the government to release information about those who had been 
detained in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The requested information 
included names, dates of arrest and release, and reasons for detention. The disclosure 
request had a strong democratic justification: Evaluation of the executive’s behavior 
could not easily come from a public not provided with this information. In ruling that 
disclosure was not required, the court relied on a broad interpretation of exemption 7(A) 
of FOIA, which exempts “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes 
. . . to the extent that the production could reasonably be expected to interfere with 
enforcement proceedings.”
65  
                                                 
60 321 F3d at 1143. 
61 Id. 
62 Id at 1145. 
63 Id at 1150. 
64 331 F3d 918 (DC Cir 2003). 
65 5 USC § 552 (2000). 
14 As Judge Tatel emphasized in dissent, the court’s interpretation of this exemption 
was exceptionally deferential to the government’s vague statements about potential 
harms.
66 The court was entirely aware of this point. In language that is closely linked to 
Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion in Hamdi, the court emphasized that “the judiciary 
owes some measure of deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a 
uniquely executive purview. . . . We have consistently reiterated the principle of 
deference to the executive in the FOIA context when national security concerns are 
implicated. . . . [W]e have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to 
the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”
67 
Indeed, the court went so far as to comment on the distinctive nature of the current threat: 
“America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities far 
beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore.”
68 In fact the court insisted that deference 
was “mandated by the separation of powers,”
69 suggesting that disclosure under FOIA 
would raise constitutional problems. The court left no doubt about the motivation for its 
action: “We are in accord with several federal courts that have wisely respected the 
executive’s judgment in prosecuting the national response to terrorism.”
70 What is most 
noteworthy about the decision, then, is not the outcome, but the broad pronouncements 
about the need to defer to the executive. 
Within the District of Columbia, the district courts have shown a similar tendency 
to National Security Maximalism. Consider, for example, ACLU v Department of 
Justice,
71 in which organizations sought information involving the government’s use of § 
215 of the Patriot Act. Section 215 gives the FBI broad power to “make an application 
for an order requiring production of any tangible things . . . for an investigation to obtain 
foreign intelligence information . . . or to protect against international terrorism.”
72 In 
particular, the plaintiffs sought to use FOIA to find out (1) the total number of § 215 
requests received by the National Security Law Unit of the FBI and (2) any and all 
records relating to § 215. Notwithstanding the fact that the Department of Justice had 
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15 previously made several disclosures of its behavior under the Patriot Act, the court ruled 
broadly that the national security exemption of FOIA justified the failure to disclose the 
information. It acknowledged that the “issue is hardly free from doubt,” but ruled for the 
government “because it [was] mindful of the ‘long-recognized deference to the executive 
on national security issues.’”
73 Thus the court deferred, not to specific explanations by 
the executive, but to the vague claims that release of the number of § 215 field requests 
“poses the continuing potential to harm our national security by enabling our adversaries 
to conduct their intelligence or international terrorist activities more securely.”
74 The 
court’s willingness to embrace National Security Maximalism is best understand in light 
of a background principle in favor of executive power in the domain of national security. 
  A similar approach can be found in Edmonds v Department of Justice.
75 There the 
court gave an exceedingly broad reading to the “state secrets privilege” so as to dismiss a 
Privacy Act claim brought by a self-styled whistleblower at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. One of the most striking parts of the court’s opinion came in a footnote, in 
which it addressed the possibility of staying the case rather than dismissing it: “This is 
due not only to the nature of the information, but also because the imminent threat of 
terrorism will not be eliminated anytime in the foreseeable future, but is an endeavor that 
will consume out nation’s attention indefinitely.”
76 Under FOIA, then, National Security 
Maximalism has been explicitly endorsed within the D.C. Circuit, in holdings that fit well 
with the general approach in Al Odah. 
 2.  The Fourth Circuit. Broad rulings in favor of executive authority have also 
come from the Fourth Circuit.
77 The most prominent of these is Hamdi v Rumsfeld.
78 
There the Court held that enemy combatants, captured on the battlefield, could be 
detained indefinitely and without trial, even if they were American citizens. In so ruling, 
the Court relied largely on the President’s power as Commander in Chief, contending that 
this power includes “the authority to detain those captured in armed struggle” and also 
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16 “to deport or detain alien enemies during the duration of hostilities” and “to confiscate or 
destroy enemy property.”
79  
The central question in the case involved the procedural protection, if any, that 
would accompany the exercise of the Commander in Chief power. The Court emphasized 
the need to defer to the President: “The Constitution’s allocation of the warmaking 
powers reflects not only the expertise and experience lodged within the executive, but 
also the more fundamental truth that those branches most accountable to the people 
should be the ones to undertake the ultimate protection and to ask the ultimate sacrifice 
from them.”
80 Hence deference to the executive would be the basic rule.
81 The court was 
aware that in denying fair procedure, the President was doing something unusual. But 
changed circumstances justified this step. “As the nature of threats to America evolves, 
along with the means of carrying those threats out, the nature of enemy combatants may 
change also. In the face of such change, separation of powers does not deny the executive 
branch the essential tool of adaptability.”
82  
Indeed the Court said that the source of the detention was not a statute, but 
“Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, wherein the President is given the war 
power.”
83 (I will return to this important statement in due course.) Deference to the 
President stems from this explicit grant of authority. So long as a detention “is one 
legitimately made pursuant to the war powers,” it must be respected.
84 A general 
statement on the part of the executive, supporting the claim that a citizen was detained in 
the course of war and qualified as an enemy combatant, would be sufficient.
85 The court 
left no doubt that this conclusion stemmed from National Security Maximalism: “The 
constitutional allocation of war powers affords the President extraordinarily broad 
authority as Commander in Chief and compels courts to assume a deferential posture.”
86  
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17 That deference required the conclusion that Hamdi could be held indefinitely, 
even after the end of the relevant hostilities.
87 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
referred to the judgments of the executive branch, without even pausing to consider what 
kind of authorization Congress had given it.
88 
 
III.  Three Problems with National Security Maximalism 
 
“In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of 
guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to 
the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain security. For 
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of Government asked to counter a serious threat 
is not the branch on which to rests the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the 
will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory. . . . A reasonable balance is more likely to 
be reached on the judgment of a different branch. . . . Hence the need for an assessment by 
Congress before citizens are subject to lockup, likewise the need for a clearly expressed 
congressional resolution of the competing claims.”
89 
 
“Judges are sometimes called upon to be courageous, because they must sometimes stand up 
to what is generally supreme in a democracy: the popular will. Their most significant roles in our 
system are to protect the individual criminal defendant against the occasional excesses of that 
popular will, and to preserve the checks and balances within our constitutional system that are 
precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of that popular will.”
90 
 
 
In the abstract, National Security Maximalism has a great deal of appeal. Far 
more than Congress, the President is in a position to act quickly and decisively to protect 
the citizenry. He is also likely to be able to acquire relevant information about what must 
be done and about when to do it. Because the President is Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, Congress cannot override the President’s judgments about how to carry 
out a lawful war. Justice Thomas correctly emphasizes that Alexander Hamilton defended 
the creation of a “unitary executive” as a means of ensuring energy, coordination, and 
dispatch in the presidency.
91 These qualities are relevant above all in time of war. By 
contrast, courts lack good tools for assessing the President’s claims of military necessity.  
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89 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 US 2633, 2655 (2004) (Souter, joined by Ginsburg, concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). 
90 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1180 (1989). 
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18 At least equally important, judicial errors may turn out to be disastrous rather than 
merely harmful. To be sure, American practice suggests that judges are most unlikely to 
err by protecting civil liberties; in our history, it is hard to find even a single case in 
which judicial protection of freedom seriously damaged national security. But if Liberty 
Maximalism were accepted, some such errors would become far more probable. In 
ordinary contexts, even those that involve criminal justice, the stakes are not nearly so 
high. There is every reason for courts to avoid a decision that leads to freedom for 
terrorists, or to disclosure of information that helps those who wants to kill Americans. 
Structural concerns, along with simple prudence, argue in favor of considerable judicial 
deference to presidential choices when national security is at risk. These points provide 
important cautionary notes; they help to explain why Liberty Maximalism is senseless. 
But for several reasons, National Security Maximalism should itself be rejected. 
 
A. Tendentious Readings of the Constitution 
 
If National Security Maximalism were mandated by the Constitution, judges 
would be bound to follow it. But far from requiring National Security Maximalism, the 
Constitution is best read to forbid it.   
No one doubts that the President has considerable power in the domain of national 
security. I have emphasized that under Article II, he is explicitly authorized to be 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” He is allowed “to 
make Treaties,” at least when two-thirds of the senators concur. He is authorized to 
“appoint Ambassadors” and “other public Ministers and Consuls.” He “shall receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.” But none of this supports Justice Thomas’ 
suggestion that the President has “primary responsibility—along with the necessary 
power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.” 
Nor does anything in the document support the Fourth Circuit’s suggestion that under 
Article II, “the President is given the war power.” On the contrary, that view is a 
tendentious reading of the legal materials. To see why, let us turn to Article I. 
19 Perhaps most notably, Congress, rather than the President, has the power “to 
declare War.” 
92 The Constitution also grants Congress, not the President, the power “to 
raise and support Armies.” It authorizes Congress “to provide and maintain a Navy.” In a 
formulation that bears on the President’s supposedly inherent power to torture, and that 
much complicates any claims about the broad power of the Commander in Chief, the 
founding document permits Congress to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces.” It is Congress that is authorized to raise funds to “provide 
for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.” Congress, rather than 
the President, is empowered to “regulate Commerce with foreign nations.” Congress is 
also authorized to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offenses against the Law of Nations,” and also to “make Rules concerning Captures 
on Land and Water.” It is under Article I, not Article II, that the Constitution allows 
suspension of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.” The fact that the Suspension Clause can be found in Article I tends to 
suggest that Congress, not the President, is entitled to suspend the writ.
93 
In this light, the Constitution does not repose in the President anything like the 
general authority “to protect the national security.” On the contrary, the more natural 
reading of the document is that protection of national security is parceled out between 
Congress and the President -- and that if either has the dominant role, it is the national 
lawmaker. To be sure, the Commander in Chief Clause does give the President the 
authority to direct the armed forces, an expansive authority
94; but even that authority is 
subject to legislative constraints, because Congress controls the budget and because 
Congress can choose not to declare war. And if Congress refuses either to authorize the 
use of force or to declare war, the President is generally not—on the best reading of the 
document—entitled to commence hostilities.
95 The Commander in Chief Clause allows 
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20 the President to manage wars; but it does not give him “the war power.” All of this means 
that National Security Maximalism cannot claim a strong constitutional pedigree. 
Of course, the constitutional text is hardly all there is to our constitutional 
tradition.
96 In the domain of separation of powers, historical practices and changes over 
time are highly relevant. As Justice Frankfurter contended, “It is an inadmissibly narrow 
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution 
and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”
97 In this context, an 
understanding of that “gloss” greatly favors the President. There can be no doubt that for 
questions of national security, the President has assumed authority that the text alone 
might not sanction. The power to make war is a leading example; the President has long 
engaged in military actions without the kind of legislative authorization that Article I 
appears to require.
98  
Historical “glosses” on constitutional text might well be taken to argue in the 
direction of National Security Maximalism. They make it plausible to contend that the 
President has more authority, in the domain of national security, than the document alone 
appears to contemplate. Undoubtedly the increasing power of the President is largely a 
product of functional considerations having to do with the rise of the United States as an 
international power and the growing need for energy and dispatch. But even when the 
document is thus glossed, it remains tendentious to contend that when the nation is at 
risk, the President must be in charge of the apparatus of government. To say this is to 
reject a constitutional accommodation that, by text and tradition, unambiguously retains 
Congress’ role as the nation’s lawmaker. 
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21  
B. The Incentives of the Executive Branch 
 
The second problem with National Security Maximalism is that it understates the 
risks of unlimited presidential authority. The executive branch perceives protection of the 
nation’s security as one of its principal tasks, in part because political retribution will fall 
swiftly on any President who fails in that task. When the nation is under threat, the 
executive will naturally take precautionary steps to reduce the risks. So far, so good. But 
recall here Attorney General Biddle’s suggestion: “The Constitution has never greatly 
bothered any wartime President.”
99 The question is whether internal dynamics, or 
external checks, will help to ensure that the precautionary steps are optimal rather than 
excessive. For two reasons, National Security Maximalism is far too optimistic on that 
count.
100 
1. Internal dynamics, unitariness, and group polarization. Internal dynamics 
present a serious problem, precisely because the executive branch is designed so as to be 
neither diverse nor deliberative, certainly as compared with the national legislature. As 
Justice Thomas emphasized in Hamdi, the executive branch is “unitary” in principle
101; it 
is run by a single person, and he is constitutionally entitled to fill his branch with like-
minded people. And here is a real difficulty. One of the most robust findings in modern 
social science is that after deliberation, like-minded people tend to end up thinking a 
more extreme version of what they thought before deliberation began.
102 Ordinary 
processes within the executive branch are all too likely to produce not careful 
investigation of alternatives, but a heightened version of what executive branch officials 
believed in advance.
103 As a result, liberty might well be at risk.
104  
Of course a presidential disposition in favor of liberty over security
105 can alter 
this dynamic. Suppose, for example, that the President and his advisers believe that some 
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22 national security risk is trivial while a small group within the administration disagrees. It 
is predictable that precautionary steps will not be taken even though they are justified.
106 
Deliberative processes among like-minded people can produce excessive rather than 
insufficient concern for liberty.
107 In addition, a system of internal checks and balances 
can alter the dynamic by which groups end up amplifying their antecedent tendencies.
108  
Different agencies and departments often have different agendas and interests; consider 
the notorious fact that the Department of State and the Department of Defense often 
disagree on issues of both law and policy. A President can certainly take steps to ensure a 
diversity of views; it is possible to structure executive branch processes so as to create 
internal safeguards.
109  
My only suggestion here is that there can be no assurance that the executive 
branch, consisting of people who work under a single president and usually seeking 
internal consensus, will consider the relevant factors in a way that produces sensible 
outcomes. If the  outlook of the President and his closest advisers includes a 
predisposition toward aggressive steps to counteract national security risks, even at the 
expense of liberty, the executive branch is likely to blunder. History offers countless 
illustrations.
110  
As an example of a failure of deliberation within the executive branch, consider 
the account in the 2004 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which 
explicitly accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of groupthink, in which the 
agency’s predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led it to fail to explore 
alternative possibilities or to obtain and use the information that it actually held.
111 In the 
Committee’s view, the CIA “demonstrated several aspects of group think: examining few 
alternatives, selective gathering of information, pressure to conform within the group or 
withhold criticism, and collective rationalization.”
112 Thus the agency showed a 
“tendency to reject information that contradicted the presumption” that Iraq had weapons 
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23 of mass destruction.
113 Because of that presumption, the agency failed to use its own 
formalized methods “to challenge assumptions and ‘group think,’ such as ‘red teams,’ 
‘devil’s advocacy,’ and other types of alternative or competitive analysis.”
114 Above all, 
the Committee’s conclusions emphasize the CIA’s failure to elicit and aggregate 
information. Through processes of this sort, it is easy to imagine that liberty could be 
sacrificed in favor of national security, even if there is no adequate justification for the 
sacrifice. 
The claim of the Senate Select Committee is a remarkable and even uncanny echo 
of one that followed the 2003 investigation of failures at NASA, stressing that agency’s 
similar failure to elicit competing views, including those based on information held by 
agency employees.
115 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board explicitly attributed 
the accident to NASA’s unfortunate culture, one that does too little to elicit information. 
In the Board’s words, NASA lacks “checks and balances.”
116 It pressures people to 
follow a “party line.”
117 At NASA, “it is difficult for minority and dissenting opinions to 
percolate up through the agency’s hierarchy”
118 -- even though, the Board contended, 
effective safety programs require the encouragement of minority opinions and bad news. 
Here too the unitariness of the relevant agency was a central source of the problem. 
These examples of executive branch failure reflect the process known as group 
polarization, through which like-minded people often go to unjustified extremes.
119 If 
those within an executive agency believe that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, that 
very belief is likely to be heightened after members have started to talk. And if those 
within the executive branch think that some abridgement of civil liberties is necessary 
and desirable as a precautionary measure, internal deliberations are likely to produce 
polarization in the direction of the antecedent belief. Of course internal deliberations will 
not produce a final outcome if external political checks exist; an outraged public is often 
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24 able to discipline presidential choices. Sometimes political checks will ensure against 
unjustified intrusions on liberty. But to understand this point, we have to make a 
distinction. 
2. Selective denials of liberty. Some restrictions on liberty apply to all or most -- 
as in, for example, a general increase in security procedures at airports, or a measure that 
subjects everyone, citizens and noncitizens alike, to special scrutiny when they are 
dealing with substances that might be used in bioterrorism. Other restrictions on liberty 
apply to some or few—as in, for example, restrictions on Japanese-Americans during 
World War II, racial profiling, or the confinement of enemy aliens at Guantanamo Bay.
120 
When restrictions apply to all or most, it is reasonable to think that political safeguards 
provide a strong check on unjustified government action. If the burden of the restriction 
is widely shared, it is unlikely to be acceptable unless most people are convinced that 
there is good reason for it; and for genuinely burdensome restrictions, people will not be 
easily convinced unless a good reason is apparent or provided. But if the restriction is 
imposed on an identifiable subgroup, the political check is weakened. Liberty-reducing 
intrusions can be imposed even if they are difficult to justify. These are the circumstances 
in which political checks are unlikely to provide an adequate safeguard against 
unjustified presidential intrusions on liberty.
121  
These claims can be illuminated by a glance at the views of Frederick Hayek 
about the rule of law. Hayek writes, “how comparatively innocuous, even if irksome, are 
most such restrictions imposed on literally everybody, as . . . compared with those that 
are likely to be imposed only on some!”
 122 Thus it is “significant that most restrictions on 
what we regard as private affairs, such as sumptuary legislation, have usually been 
imposed only on selected groups of people or, as in the case of prohibition, were 
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serious harm. 
122 Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 155 (Chicago 1960). 
25 practicable only because the government reserved the right to grant exceptions.”
123 Hayek 
urges, in short, that the risk of unjustified burdens dramatically increases if they are 
selective and if most people have nothing to worry about. The claim is especially 
noteworthy in situations in which the executive is imposing restrictions on civil liberties. 
People are likely to ask, with some seriousness, whether those restrictions are in fact 
justified if the result is burdensome consequence on them. But if other people face the 
relevant burdens, then the mere fact of “risk,” and the mere presence of fear, will seem to 
provide a justification. 
The danger of unjustified infringement is amplified when the victims of the 
infringement can be seen as an identifiable group that is readily separable from “us.” 
Stereotyping of groups significantly increases when people are in a state of fear; when 
people are primed to think about their own death, they are more likely to think and act in 
accordance with group-based stereotypes.
124 Experimental findings of this kind support 
the intuitive idea that when people are afraid, they are far more likely to tolerate 
government action that abridges the freedom of members of some “out-group.” And if 
this is the case, responses to social fear, in the form of infringements on liberties, will not 
receive the natural political checks that arise when majorities suffer as well as benefit 
from them. The simple idea here is that liberty-infringing action is most likely to be 
justified if those who support that action are also burdened by it; in that event, the 
political process contains a built-in protection against unjustifiable restrictions. In all 
cases, it follows that free societies need some methods for ensuring against excessive 
reactions to unjustified intrusions on civil liberties.  
Consider in this regard an argument in a famous opinion by Justice Robert 
Jackson.
125 In that opinion, Justice Jackson made two points. The first is that when the 
Court rules that some conduct cannot be regulated at all, it is intervening, in a major way, 
into democratic processes, making that conduct essentially “unregulable.” The second is 
that when the Court invalidates government action on equality grounds, it requires the 
government to increase the breadth of its restriction, thus triggering political checks 
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26 against unjustified burdens. With a modest twist on Jackson’s argument, we can see a 
potential approach for courts faced with claims about unlawful interference with civil 
liberties. If the executive is imposing a burden on an identifiable subclass of people, a 
warning flag should go up. The courts should give careful scrutiny to that burden. 
Of course these general propositions do not resolve concrete cases; everything 
turns on the particular nature of the legal  challenge. In addition, the incidence of benefits 
and burdens might result, in theory, in too much liberty rather than too much security. 
Assume, for example, that government is asked to take steps that would provide security 
to an identifiable subgroup rather than to the public as a whole, whereas the burden of 
this step would be faced by everyone; if so, we should expect it to err in the direction of 
insufficient protection of security, precisely for the reasons that Jackson emphasizes.
126 
The existence of selective benefits and burdens does not always show that the executive 
will unduly sacrifice liberty; the opposite may be true.
127 But an appreciation of the risks 
of selectivity suggests the problems with National Security Maximalism. Political 
processes are unlikely to provide an adequate check when government imposes burdens 
on people who are unable to protect themselves in the political process. The legislature 
has some advantages over the executive on this count, simply because it is both diverse 
and deliberative, in a way that ought to ensure a degree of representation for identifiable 
groups that are at risk. 
To summarize: National Security Maximalism cannot claim much support in the 
Constitution itself; on the contrary, the document does not give the President “the war 
power.” The strongest claim for a maximalist approach emphasizes the Commander in 
Chief Clause, which does give the President some “inherent” power; but that power must 
be read in the light of a host of other provisions conferring broad authority on Congress. 
In addition, National Security Maximalism reposes excessive confidence in the President. 
Deliberative processes within a unitary branch are likely to lead to an amplification of 
preexisting tendencies, not toward a system of internal checks and balances. When 
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27 deprivations of liberty are limited to an identifiable few—as they frequently are—
external checks on the executive provide an insufficient safeguard of civil liberties. But 
Liberty Maximalism is neither feasible nor desirable. Is there anything that courts might 
do to help? And what does American history say about that question? 
 
IV.  The Minimalist Alternative 
 
“Even more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors is 
the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”
128 
 
  As an alternative to National Security Maximalism, we might imagine a 
minimalist approach. But what, precisely, is minimalism? It is easy to imagine a range of 
answers, simply because minimalism is relative, not absolute. Suppose that a court 
requires congressional authorization for presidential detentions of American citizens on 
American soil. That ruling is more minimalist than a decision to require congressional 
authorization for any and all presidential detentions; but it is less minimalist than a ruling 
that in the particular circumstances of a given case, the President must obtain 
congressional authorization to detain a particular American citizen on American soil. 
With respect to minimalism, there is a continuum rather than a set of dichotomies.
129  
•  Belonging at the minimalist extreme is a refusal to hear a case at all, as in a denial of 
certiorari or a jurisdictional ruling. Refusals to adjudicate offer no guidance at all. 
They leave everything undecided.  
•  Slightly less minimalist is an authoritative ruling, and therefore a holding, but one 
that is unaccompanied by much in the way of reasoning -- as in, for example, a 
judgment without opinion or a ruling whose rationale is so thin and vague that it fail 
to give a real account of why the court ruled as it did.  
•  Less minimalist, but firmly within the minimalist camp, is a narrow and shallow 
decision, tightly tied to the facts of the particular case and avoiding broad statements 
about the relevant law. 
•  Still less minimalist, but minimalist still, is a set of established doctrines that embody 
a self-conscious refusal to rule ambitiously. Consider, for example, the avoidance 
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28 canon -- the notion that statutes should be construed so as to avoid constitutional 
doubts.
130 This idea is less minimalist than an insistent (stubborn? infuriating?) 
refusal to specify the circumstances under which statutes will and should be so 
construed. In its way, the avoidance canon is wide and therefore ambitious. In fact the 
avoidance canon could well be justified deeply rather than shallowly—by 
emphasizing, for example, the value of congressional rather than merely executive 
deliberation on constitutionally sensitive issues.
131 Nonetheless, the avoidance canon 
is easily taken as part of the minimalist project. The reason is that it leaves the most 
fundamental issues undecided; it refuses to take a stand on the contested issues of 
constitutional law. 
In the context of war, minimalists want above all to avoid large-scale 
interventions into democratic processes. They do so because they know how little they 
know, and because they generally respect the wishes of a threatened nation, at least when 
Congress and the executive branch agree.  Of course sensible people acknowledge that 
courts should strike down egregious violations of constitutional rights. But outside of the 
egregious cases, courts should proceed cautiously and narrowly when national security is 
at risk. As I understand it here, the minimalist project is built on three principles in the 
context of war. First, Congress should be required to authorize any interference with 
constitutionally protected interests; as a general rule, the executive should not be allowed 
to proceed on its own. Second, any deprivation of liberty, at the individual level, should 
be accompanied by at least minimally fair procedures. Third, judicial decisions should be 
narrow and incompletely theorized. As we shall see, these three principles, the 
cornerstones of minimalism at war, do a remarkably good job of explaining the practices 
of the Supreme Court amidst war. The first principle is the most complex, and it provides 
the place to begin.
132 
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29 A.   Clear Statement Principles 
  
1. The basic framework. For many years, Israel’s General Security Service has 
engaged in certain forms of physical coercion, sometimes described as torture, against 
suspected terrorists. According to the General Security Service, these practices occurred 
only in extreme cases and as a last resort, when deemed necessary to prevent terrorist 
activity and significant loss of life. Nonetheless, practices worthy of the name “torture” 
did occur, and they were not rare. Those practices were challenged before the Supreme 
Court of Israel on the ground that they were inconsistent with the nation’s fundamental 
law. The government responded that abstractions about human rights should not be 
permitted to overcome real-world necessities so as to ban a practice that was, in certain 
circumstances, essential to prevent massive deaths in an area of the world that was often 
subject to terrorist activity. According to the government, physical coercion was justified 
in these circumstances. A judicial decision to the opposite effect would be a form of 
unjustified activism, even hubris. 
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court of Israel refused to resolve the most 
fundamental questions.
133 It declined to say whether the practices of the security forces 
would be illegitimate if expressly authorized by a democratic legislature. But the Court 
nonetheless held those practices unlawful. The Court’s principal argument was that if 
such coercion were to be acceptable, it could not be because the General Security 
Service, with its narrow agenda, said so. At a minimum, the disputed practices must be 
endorsed by the national legislature, after a full democratic debate on the precise 
question. “[T]his is an issue that must be decided by the legislative branch which 
represents the people. We do not take any stand on this matter at this time. It is there that 
various considerations must be weighed.”
134  
It is worthwhile to pause over the central feature of this decision. The Supreme 
Court of Israel required clear legislative authorization for this particular intrusion on 
liberty; it insisted that presidential action, under a vague or ambiguous law, would not be 
enough. The Court’s decision stands for the general principle that even when national 
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30 security is threatened, the legislative branch of government must explicitly authorize 
disputed infringements on civil liberty. The reason for this safeguard is to ensure against 
inadequately considered restrictions—and to insist that political safeguards, in the form 
of agreement from a diverse and deliberative branch of government, are a minimal 
precondition for intrusions on civil liberties. In these ways, the requirement of clear 
legislative statement enlists the idea of checks and balances in the service of individual 
rights—not through flat bans on government action, but through requiring two, rather 
than one, branches of government to approve. 
The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum, sketched above, provides a startling 
and ironic contrast here. While the Supreme Court of Israel held that clear legislative 
authorization is required to permit torture, the United States Department of Justice 
concluded that clear legislative prohibition is insufficient to forbid torture. But it is 
reasonable to doubt whether the Supreme Court of the United States would accept this 
reasoning. The reason is that in a large number of cases, many involving national 
security, the Court has required a clear congressional statement before permitting the 
executive to intrude on an interest that has a plausible claim to constitutional protection. 
These decisions can be understood to create “nondelegation canons”—canons of 
construction ensuring that Congress and the President jointly, rather than the President 
alone, will make decisions on constitutionally sensitive issues.
135 In the context of threats 
to national security, nondelegation canons provide a cornerstone of the practice of 
minimalism at war. 
As a leading example, consider Kent v Dulles,
136 decided in the midst of the Cold 
War. In that case, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, denied a passport to 
Rockwell Kent, a member of the Communist Party, who sought to attend a meeting of the 
“World Council of Peace” in Helsinki, Finland. The State Department denied the passport 
on two grounds, both supported by its own regulations. First, Kent was a Communist; 
second, Kent had “a consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line.” 
Under the governing statute, enacted in 1926, the Secretary of State was authorized “to 
grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and 
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31 prescribe for, and on behalf of, the United States . . . .”
137 Kent objected that the denial of 
the passport was unconstitutional. 
  The Supreme Court could have decided the case on any number of grounds. It 
could have said that Kent’s first amendment rights had been violated—that it was 
unconstitutional to deny someone a passport because of his political convictions. It could 
have said that the decision of the Secretary of State violated Kent’s right to travel—that 
the due process clause includes a right to leave the country and that the government needs 
particularly strong grounds for interfering with that right. It could have said that the grant 
of open-ended discretion to the Secretary of State violated the nondelegation doctrine—
that under Article I, § 1, Congress must give the Secretary some guidelines by which to 
decide whether to grant or to deny passports. Or it could have said that the denial of the 
passport was lawful—authorized by the language of the relevant statute and, as 
authorized, within constitutional bounds. All of these routes would have been simple and 
straightforward. 
  The Court did none of these things. Instead it held that the denial of the passport 
was beyond the statutory authority of the Secretary of State. Its analysis began with a 
bow in the direction of constitutional requirements. In the Court’s view, the “right to 
travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due 
process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”
138 The question of statutory authority would 
be approached in this light. And while the statute was phrased in broad terms, the 
Secretary had “long exercised” his power “quite narrowly.”
139 In fact passports had been 
refused in only two categories of cases: those in which the applicant’s citizenship and 
allegiance to the United States were in doubt; and those in which the applicant was 
engaged in unlawful conduct. No one claimed that Kent fell in either of these categories. 
“We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made a passport 
necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, 
a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen 
for any substantive reason he may choose.”
140 The Court was concerned that Congress 
                                                 
137 Act of July 3, 1926, ch 772, 44 Stat 887, Part 2, codified as amended at 22 USC § 211a (2000). 
138 357 US at 125. 
139 Id at 127. 
140 Id at 128. 
32 had particularly authorized the executive branch to do as it did. “No such showing of 
extremity, no such showing of joint action by the Chief Executive and the Congress to 
curtail a constitutional right of the citizen has been made here.”
141  
  The Court left no doubt that its decision was constitutionally inspired. It drew 
attention to the fact that the case involved “an exercise by an American citizen of an 
activity included in constitutional protection.”
142 For that reason, the Court would “not 
readily infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion.”
143 The right 
of exit had constitutional foundations, and if it is “to be regulated, it must be pursuant to 
the law-making functions of the Congress.”
144 Hence the Court would “construe narrowly 
all delegated powers that curtail or dilute” those “activities and enjoyment, natural and 
often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen.”
145 The Court explicitly linked 
its narrow construction with the nondelegation principle, citing cases that requires any 
delegation to be accompanied by intelligible standards.
146. The Court emphasized that it 
“would be faced with important constitutional questions” if Congress “had given the 
Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or 
associations.”
147 But “Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms.”
148 
Proceeding in minimalist fashion, the Court left undecided the question whether Congress 
could constitutionally give that authority to the President. The advantage of the 
minimalist approach is that it reflects commendable uncertainty about difficult questions, 
enlisting political safeguards as the first line of defense against unjustified intrusions on 
freedom. 
Was Kent v Dulles decided during war? In a sense, it was not; military forces 
were not engaged in 1958, and the Court was aware of that fact. The Court explicitly 
noted that “more restrictive measures were applied in 1918 and in 1941 as war 
measures,” and it said that it would not “equate this present problem of statutory 
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33 construction with problems that may arise under the war power.”
149 But in 1958, the Cold 
War was at its height, and in the period many people believed that the United States was, 
in some sense, at war with the Soviet Union.
150 
Did Kent v Dulles involve the Commander in Chief Clause? That clause was not 
directly mentioned. But the Court’s crucial citation, in Kent v Dulles, involved an explicit 
reference to a case involving the Commander in Chief power: The Steel Seizure Case.
151 
In that case, the Court’s method was exceedingly close to that used in Kent v Dulles. 
Hence The Steel Seizure Case is highly relevant to the question of presidential power 
when national security is at risk. That much-discussed decision is illuminatingly seen in 
minimalist terms. 
  In 1951,the President directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of, 
and to operate, the majority of steels mills in the United States. The directive was 
prompted by a threatened strike in the steel industry, one that would apparently 
jeopardize the continued availability of steel. According to the President, national defense 
was at risk, because steel was indispensable as a component in nearly all weapons and 
war materials. The President defended his action as justified by his power as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. But the Supreme Court firmly rejected the 
argument. It emphasized that there “is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to 
take possession of the property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which 
our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied.”
152 It 
stressed that lawmaking power is vested in Congress, not in the President: “The Founders 
of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad 
times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the 
hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice.”
153 Justice Frankfurter wrote separately, 
also emphasizing the need for both minimalism and checks and balances.
154 But Justice 
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34 Frankfurter’s opinion, and that of the Court itself, have come to be less important than the 
concurring opinion of Justice Jackson, who explored in some detail the central 
importance of a grant of authority from Congress.
155  
Jackson famously offered a tripartite division of presidential authority, suggesting 
that the President’s “authority is at its maximum”
156 when he is acting under an 
authorization from Congress, and “at its lowest ebb” when the President’s exercise of 
power is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”
157 Less 
famously but also significantly, Jackson offered a narrow construction of the Commander 
in Chief clause, and showed a great deal of skepticism about the idea of “inherent” 
presidential power. The Commander in Chief clause, he said, “undoubtedly puts the 
Nation’s armed forces under presidential command.”
158 But it could not be taken “as 
support for any presidential action, internal or external, involving use of force . . . .”
159 
More broadly, Justice Jackson said that “no doctrine that the Court could promulgate 
would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of 
foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is so unknown, can vastly 
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the 
Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”
160 Jackson challenged the “loose and 
irresponsible use of adjectives” that affected “much legal discussion of presidential 
powers,” including adjectives like inherent, implied, incidental, war, plenary, and 
emergency.
161 Jackson expressed skepticism about these adjectives, suggesting that they 
amounted to an effort to “amend” the work of those who produced the Constitution.  
2.  Illustrations. Jackson’s legislature-centered framework helps to organize a 
remarkable number of Supreme Court decisions involving civil liberty and war, many of 
them written before The Steel Seizure Case. Time and again, the Court has emphasized 
the importance of congressional authorization for presidential action and refused to rule 
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35 that the President has the power to act on his own. In these ways, the Court has acted in 
good minimalist fashion, leaving many of the most fundamental questions undecided.
162  
Consider, for example, Ex Parte Endo,
163 in which the Court struck down the 
detention of concededly loyal Japanese-Americans on the West Coast. The case involved 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, sought on behalf of Mitsue Endo, a loyal citizen 
who had been placed in a relocation center. The Court held that Endo would have to be 
released. In so holding, it relied on the absence of statutory authorization for her 
detention. “In reaching that conclusion we do not come to the underlying constitutional 
issues which have been argued. For we conclude that, whatever power the War 
Relocation Authority may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to 
subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure.”
164 The Court 
emphasized that even in the midst of war, the President would have to identify clear 
statutory authorization for any such detention: “In interpreting a wartime measure we 
must assume that their purpose was to allow for the greatest possible accommodation 
between those liberties and the exigencies of war.”
165 Thus the constitutional issues 
would be avoided in light of “the silence of the legislative history and of the Act and the 
Executive Orders on the power to detain.”
166 The Court added that “if there is to be the 
greatest possible accommodation of the liberties of the citizen with this war measure, any 
such implied power [of the President] must be narrowly confined to the precise purpose 
of the evacuation program.”
167  
To be sure, the Court had also held, on the same day, that the forced evacuation of 
Japanese-Americans was acceptable as a matter of statutory and constitutional law—a 
holding to which I will turn in due course.
168 But as in Kent v Dulles, the Court 
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36 emphasized that for the evacuation, “the Congress and the Chief Executive moved in 
coordinated action”
169—a clear signal that the existence of simultaneous and explicit 
approval by both branches was both necessary and sufficient to produce judicial 
deference. The clarity of the signal is underlined by a pointed reference to Endo in Kent v 
Dulles itself, citing Endo to support the proposition that narrow construction of delegated 
powers is appropriate when “activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the 
well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved.”
170 
In the same spirit is Duncan v Kahanamoku,
171 involving the imposition of 
martial law in Hawaii during World War II. Civilians in Hawaii had been imprisoned 
after a trial in military tribunals; the central question was whether those tribunals had the 
legal authority to try civilians. In its narrow ruling, the Court held that they did not. The 
Court concluded that the Hawaii Organic Act did allow the governor of the state to 
declare martial law, but it refused to agree that as a statutory matter, the governor of the 
state, even with presidential approval, could “close all the courts and supplant them with 
military tribunals.”
172 The Court acknowledged that the statutory language and history 
were unclear and stressed, as relevant to the interpretive question, “the birth, 
development, and growth of our political institutions.”
173 Because “courts and their 
procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government,” the Court would 
not construe an ambiguous statute to authorize the displacement, by the executive, of 
ordinary courts with military tribunals.
174 
The oldest example of a minimalist approach to civil liberties can be found during 
the Civil War period. President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, referring to 
§ 9, clause 2 of the Constitution, which says, “The Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”
175 The Suspension Clause is phrased in the passive voice; it does not say 
who may suspend the great writ. Chief Justice Roger Taney ruled that the President could 
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37 not suspend the writ on his own; he needed congressional authorization.
176 Chief Justice 
Taney was able to point to the fact that the Suspension Clause is found in Article I, which 
specifies the powers of Congress, rather than Article II, which deals with presidential 
authority. The textual argument is certainly powerful, but Chief Justice Taney’s 
conclusion is also supported by a structural concern, to the effect that suspension of 
habeas corpus is a grave act, one that requires a judgment by a body that is both 
deliberative and diverse.  
In fact a clear statement principle, rather than the Constitution by itself, underlies 
one of the most celebrated free speech decisions in American history: Judge Learned 
Hand’s in the Masses case.
177 At issue was an effort by the postmaster of New York to 
prevent the mailing of a revolutionary journal called The Masses. The postmaster 
invoked the Espionage Act of 1917. Judge Hand’s opinion, decided during World War I, 
was animated by free speech principles, but he rested his decision on narrow reading of 
the Act rather than on the First Amendment. Judge Hand contended under the Act, speech 
would be protected unless it expressly advocated lawless action; it could not be regulated 
merely because it did so indirectly or by implication.  
This interpretation of the Act was hardly inevitable. By its terms, the Act banned 
any effort willfully “to cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or 
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States”; it also banned any 
effort willfully to “obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.”
178 
These prohibitions could well have been understood to apply to the relevant issue of The 
Masses, which praised and even glorified conscientious objectors to the draft.
179 Judge 
Hand strained to argue that “One may admire and approve the course of a hero without 
feeling any duty to follow him. There is not the least implied intimation in these words 
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38 that others are under a duty to follow.”
180 Judge Hand’s narrow construction of the Act 
enabled him to avoid resolution of a difficult constitutional problem.  
Judge Hand’s approach was followed in some of the most famous liberty-
promoting dissenting opinions written in World War I, by Justices Louis Brandeis and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes.
181 Both Brandeis and Holmes are now celebrated for their 
insistence on the constitutional protection of free speech. But their opinions have 
unmistakable minimalist features, arguing for narrow construction of authorization to the 
executive, not for invalidation on constitutional grounds. In one case, the Postmaster 
General revoked the mailing privileges of a newspaper because it published articles that 
criticized America’s involvement in World War I and that therefore might be taken to 
obstruct military recruitment and enlistment. Refusing to interpret the Espionage Act in 
this way, both Brandeis and Holmes contended that the statute should not be read to grant 
such open-ended power to the President.
182 Justice Brandeis insisted that the real question 
“is one of statutory construction.”
183 The Postmaster General had argued that the relevant 
articles violated the Espionage Act, but the statute need not be taken in that way.
184 In a 
manner analogous to that pursued by the majority in Kent v Dulles, Justice Brandeis 
sketched the historical practices of Congress and the executive to suggest that the 
Postmaster General lacked the statutory authority to exclude materials that he deemed 
objectionable and even unlawful.
185 And Justice Brandeis explicitly invoked a clear 
statement principle on behalf of his narrow construction, suggesting that “even if the 
statutes were less clear in this respect than they seem, I should be led to adopt that 
construction because of the familiar rule” that legislative enactments should be read so as 
to avoid constitutional doubts.
186  
Justice Holmes spoke in identical terms, insisting that “it would take very strong 
language to convince me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically despotic 
power to any one man. . . . Therefore I do not consider the limits of its constitutional 
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39 power.”
187 Justice Holmes’ great dissenting opinion in Abrams did speak of the first 
amendment.
188 But his initial submission was that the governing statutes should be 
interpreted not to cover the speech that had been subject to prosecution.
189 Of course 
nothing here is meant to deny the fact that Brandeis and Holmes sometimes voted simply 
to strike legislation down on constitutional grounds. All I am emphasizing here is that in 
some striking opinions, they took a more minimalist approach to intrusions on free 
speech amidst war. 
In fact, an approach of this sort attracted the support of a majority of the Court at 
the height of the Cold War. Following Judge Hand and Justice Brandeis, the Court 
protected speech through an aggressive clear statement approach in Yates v United 
States.
190 At issue was a provision of the Smith Act, making it unlawful to “advocate, 
abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or 
destroying any government in the United States by force or violence”; to print, sell, edit, 
display, or circulate written matters so advocating; and “to organize or to help to organize 
any group or assembly of persons who reach, advocate, or encourage overthrowing or 
destroying any government in the United States by force or violence.”
191 The Court 
narrowly construed these terms, concluding that the Act does not prohibit “advocacy and 
teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle,” and that it reaches only efforts 
“to instigate action to that end.”
192 The Court referred to the constitutional difficulty but 
insisted: “We need not, however, decide the issue before us in terms of constitutional 
compulsion, for our first duty is to construe this statute. In doing so, we should not 
assume that Congress chose to disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly 
marked.”
193  
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40 The Court also offered a narrow construction of the term “organize,” which it 
limited to acts entering into the initial creation of an organization, not to acts performed 
in carrying on its activities.
194 The Court thus refused to permit the executive to interpret 
the Smith Act to enter into a “constitutional danger zone,” even though the language 
could easily have been taken to allow it to do so. What was required was clear 
congressional authorization.
195 
An analogous lesson emerges from the much-discussed decision in Ex Parte 
Quirin,
196 where the Court upheld the use of military commissions to try German 
saboteurs captured during World War II. In that case, the President asked the Court to 
hold that as Commander in Chief, the President had inherent authority to create and to 
use military tribunals. The Court refused to accept this argument: “It is unnecessary for 
present purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has 
constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional 
legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war 
before such commissions.”
197 Thus the Court posed the question as involving the unified 
position of Congress and the executive: “We are concerned only with the question 
whether it is within the constitutional power of the National Government to place 
petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the offenses with which they are 
charged.”
198 The congressional grant of authority was far from unambiguous here, and 
hence the Court’s interpretation might have been motivated, in part, by a desire to avoid 
ruling on the President’s broad claims about his authority as Commander in Chief.
199 The 
crucial point is that the Court’s reliance on congressional authorization gives Quirin an 
unmistakable minimalist character.  
In its ruling, the Quirin Court followed the path set out by the concurring justices 
in Ex Parte Milligan, which prohibited the use of military tribunals to try civilians during 
the Civil War.
200 Rejecting a broad constitutional ruling from the majority,
201 the 
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41 concurring justices said, “It is for Congress to determine the question of expediency. And 
Congress did determine it. That body did not see fit to authorize trials by military 
commission in Indiana, but by the strongest implication prohibited it . . .”
202 Avoiding the 
constitutional question, the concurring justices emphasized that the President had not 
been authorized to use military tribunals. So too in the Hamdi case, to which I will turn in 
due course; there the Court refused to consider the President’s broad claim of inherent 
authority to detain citizens who count as “enemy combatants.” It chose instead the 
minimalist route of emphasizing the existence of congressional authorization for such 
detentions.
203 
3. Korematsu and Hirabayashi redux: minimalism in surprising places. This 
catalogue should be sufficient to show that a primary precept of minimalism in war, 
requiring congressional authorization for intrusions on liberty, helps to organize a 
remarkable variety of judicial decisions. But I have not discussed the Supreme Court’s 
most notorious decisions in this domain: Hirabayashi v United States
204 and Korematsu v 
United States.
205 In Hirabayashi, the Court upheld a curfew order imposed by a military 
commander on an American citizen of Japanese ancestry. In Korematsu, the Court upheld 
a military order excluding an American citizen of Japanese descent from San Leandro, 
California. It is tempting and probably even right to see both decisions as cowardly and 
deplorable capitulations, on the part of the Court, to intrusions on liberty that could find 
no justification in national security concerns.
206 It is even tempting to see both decisions 
as vindications of National Security Maximalism. But the Court’s overall approach also 
has an unmistakable minimalist feature, requiring executive action to be authorized by 
Congress, and deferring to it only if it has been so authorized.  
Hirabayashi was largely decided on institutional grounds. The Court’s initial 
submission was that “so far as it lawfully could, Congress authorized and implemented 
such curfew orders as the commanding officer should promulgate pursuant to the 
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42 Executive Order of the President.”
207 Thus dual branch lawmaking, rather than executive 
unilateralism,
208 was involved: “The question then is . . . whether, acting in cooperation, 
Congress and the President have constitutional authority to impose the curfew restriction 
here complained of.”
209 The Court ultimately concluded that “it was within the 
constitutional power of Congress and the executive arm of the Government to prescribe 
this curfew order for the period under consideration.”
210 In fact one of Hirabayashi’s 
principal objections was that the curfew had been an unconstitutional delegation by 
Congress; the Court’s response was that the statute was to be read together with the 
executive’s actions under it, so that “the standard set up for the guidance of the military 
commander, and the action taken and the reasons for it, are in fact recorded in the 
military orders.”
211  
Of course the Court could have ruled otherwise, and I am not suggesting that it 
was right to do as it did. The Court could have concluded that the orders were 
unacceptable unless Congress had specifically set out the governing standards through 
ordinary law. A nondelegation challenge was hardly implausible; and the Court would 
have done better, in my view, to have proceeded as in Kent v Dulles, so as to find an 
absence of sufficient legislative authorization for an extraordinary intrusion into the 
domain of liberty. The general tenor of the Court’s opinion might reasonably be invoked 
in support of National Security Maximalism: “Since the Constitution commits to the 
Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and 
conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of 
judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or 
danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. . . . [I]t is not for any court to sit 
in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.”
212 Note, 
however, that even here, the Court stressed that both Congress and the executive had 
concurred; the executive was not acting on its own.  
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43 In Korematsu, the Court similarly emphasized that the exclusion order was based 
on a recent statute, making it a crime to “remain in . . . any military area of military zone” 
so prescribed by a competent official.
213 The exclusion order, issued by General Dewitt, 
was specifically authorized by an Executive Order by the President, who was in turn 
acting under congressional authorization. The Court stressed the institutional force 
behind the exclusion: “The Hirabayashi conviction and this one thus rest on the same 
1942 Congressional Act and the same basic executive and military orders.”
214 The Court 
pointedly noted that it was dealing not with the executive alone, but with “the war power 
of Congress and the Executive.”
215   
Justice Frankfurter underlined the institutional point: “I find nothing in the 
Constitution which denies to Congress the power to enforce such a valid military order by 
making its violation an offense triable in the civil courts.”
216 Justice Jackson, dissenting, 
also emphasized institutional factors, but saw them as cutting the other way: “[T]he ‘law’ 
of which this prisoner is convicted of disregarding is not found in an act of Congress, but 
in a military order. Neither the Act of Congress nor the Executive Order of the President, 
nor both together, would afford a basis for this conviction. It rests on the orders of 
General Dewitt.”
217 This institutional point plainly contributed to Justice Jackson’s 
refusal to vote to uphold the evacuation. 
But let us take the Court’s three decisions as a whole. If we consider Hirabayashi 
and Korematsu together with Ex Parte Endo, we can obtain a fresh perspective on what 
the Court was doing with the American government’s acts of discrimination against 
Japanese-Americans. In short, it was rejecting National Security Maximalism and Liberty 
Maximalism in favor of a distinctive form of minimalism. In none of the three cases did 
the Court issue a broad ruling on presidential authority. When the executive acted without 
congressional authorization, it lost; it survived legal attack only when Congress had 
specifically permitted its action. In all three cases, the Court paid exceedingly careful 
attention to the role of legislation, and thus refused to rule that the Commander in Chief 
power allowed the President to act on his own. In permitting the executive to implement a 
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44 curfew and an exclusion order, the Court rejected Liberty Maximalism, indicating that it 
would yield to the shared judgments of the two democratically accountable branches.  
Of course it would be possible to question the Court’s holdings. In my view, the 
Court should have required greater legislative clarity in Hirabayashi. I have said that the 
Court should have ruled, in the fashion of Kent v Dulles, that if Japanese-Americans were 
going to be deprived of their liberty, it must be as a result of clear and specific 
instructions from the national legislature.
218 And in Korematsu, Justice Jackson’s opinion 
could have been recast to emphasize the absence of clear authorization from either 
Congress or the President. But for present purposes, the most important point lies 
elsewhere. Hirabayashi, Korematsu, and Endo reflect an emphatically minimalist 
approach to civil liberties in wartime—an approach that both defers to, and insists on, 
agreement from both of the democratically accountable branches.  
From the standpoint of liberty, of course, skeptics will object that deference is 
unacceptable even if both branches agree. All I am suggesting here is that congressional 
authorization should ordinarily be required for presidential intrusion into the domain of 
constitutionally sensitive interests -- and that outside of the egregious cases, courts will, 
and usually should, hesitate if such authorization is forthcoming.  
4. Clear statements and terrorism. In the recent cases involving terrorism, clear 
statement principles have played a central role.  
a. Hamdi. Such principles were endorsed most explicitly by Justice Souter, in his 
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, in Hamdi.
219 Justice Souter’s central 
argument was that Congress had not authorized Hamdi’s detention when a clear 
statement from Congress was required:  
“In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable 
degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is 
not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular 
responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the 
branch of Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest 
the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in 
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45 liberty on the way to victory. . . . a reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the 
judgment of a different branch.” 
220 
In making this argument, Justice Souter invoked the Non-Detention Act, which 
plainly states, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States 
except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”
221 In his view, the Non-Detention Act ought 
generally to be read in accordance with its apparently “severe” terms.
222 One reason is 
that the Act was enacted against the background “of an interpretive regime that subjected 
enactments limiting liberty in wartime to the requirement of a clear statement and 
[Congress] presumably intended” the Act “to be read accordingly.”
223 Emphasizing the 
cautionary examples afforded by history, and proceeding in light of the executive’s 
incentive to favor security over liberty, Justice Souter contended that “manifest authority 
to detain” should be demanded “before detention is authorized.”
224  
Hence Justice Souter emphasized “the need for a clearly expressed congressional 
resolution of the competing claims.”
225 Not having found any such resolution, he 
concluded that the detention was unlawful. In a fashion reminiscent of Justice Jackson in 
The Steel Seizure Case, Justice Souter went on “to note the weakness of the 
Government’s claim of inherent, executive authority” to detain people.
226 He 
acknowledged the possibility that the President could do this “in a moment of genuine 
emergency, when the Government must act with no time for deliberation.”
227 But that 
was not the case here.  
I believe that Justice Souter was entirely correct to stress the importance of 
requiring a clear statement from Congress before authorizing detentions of this sort by 
the executive. But for two different reasons, I am not sure that Justice Souter was correct 
in his conclusion in Hamdi. First, and most fundamentally, a congressional authorization 
to use force is reasonably read to include the authority to detain those combatants who 
were captured during hostilities, at least for the period of those hostilities—a point to 
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46 which I will return. Second, the President claimed inherent authority to detain those 
captured on the battlefield—a claim that was at least plausible under the Commander in 
Chief clause. For this reason, the plurality’s conclusion—that Congress had authorized 
the detention—actually helped to avoid the resolution of a serious constitutional question.  
This latter point raises some real complexities for minimalism and the use of clear 
statement principles to limit presidential power. Such principles are justified, as in Kent v 
Dulles, as a means of avoiding constitutional questions by requiring a judgment by two 
branches, rather than simply one, that an invasion of liberty is justified. But in some 
(narrow) contexts, the President will be able to make a plausible argument that he has 
inherent authority to proceed with some course of action. If so, there is reason for an 
opposing clear statement principle, one that reads ambiguous statutory provisions as 
authorizing, rather than forbidding, presidential action. In fact this is an important form of 
judicial minimalism, and it is one reading of the Court’s opinion in Ex Parte Quirin.
228 
When the President has a strong claim of inherent power, the clear statement approach 
does not argue in favor of limiting his authority. But for the reasons sketched by Justice 
Jackson, broad claims of inherent power, made by reference to the Commander in Chief 
Clause, are usually not strong. On the contrary, they are usually implausible. When they 
are strong, the Hamdi plurality’s approach is the right form of minimalism. When they 
lack plausibility, Justice Souter provides the best path for the future.  
Indeed, an important aspect of the Hamdi plurality’s own approach reflects an 
endorsement of Justice Souter’s central idea. The government had argued that as a result 
of Congress’ authorization of the use of force, it was permitted to detain Hamdi 
indefinitely.
229 The plurality rejected this argument, invoking a kind of clear statement 
principle, one that read the authorization to allow detention only during active 
prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. The Court noted that “the national security 
underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ although crucially important, are broad and 
malleable.”
230 A longstanding war on terror might mean that “Hamdi’s detention could 
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47 last for the rest of his life.”
231 Congress had said nothing to allow the President to reach 
this conclusion. The Court insisted, in this light, that “indefinite detention for the purpose 
of interrogation is not authorized.”
232 It went on to conclude that detention could occur 
only for the duration of the hostilities in Afghanistan.
233 This conclusion, based on a 
narrow reading of the authorization of the use of force, is a more modest version of 
Justice Souter’s plea for a clear statement principle in Hamdi.  
b. Padilla. Minimalism of the same sort played the central role in the powerful 
decision of the court of appeals in the Padilla case.
234 At issue was the legality of the 
detention of Jose Padilla, an American citizen held as an enemy combatant after having 
been seized on American soil. The court squarely rejected the claim, urged by the 
executive and rooted in National Security Maximalism, to the effect that the “President 
has the inherent authority to detain those who take up arms against this country.”
235 The 
court of appeals correctly emphasized that Articles I and II divide the war powers, rather 
than conferring them on the executive alone.
236 The courtt added that the grant of 
numerous war-related powers “to Congress is a powerful indication that, absent express 
congressional authorization, the President’s Commander in Chief powers do not support” 
the confinement of an American citizen captured on American soil. It stressed that 
Quirin, the government’s best precedent, rested on congressional authorization rather 
than on inherent presidential authority.
237  
Thus the key issue was whether such authorization could be found here. In the 
court’s view, Congress’ authorization to use “all necessary and appropriate force” to 
respond to the September 11 attacks should be understood in light of Endo. There the 
Court emphasized that “in interpreting a war-time measure we must assume that [the 
purpose of Congress and the Executive] was to allow for the greatest possible 
accommodation between those liberties and the exigencies of war.”
238 Here no clear and 
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48 unmistakable statement could be found; and that was what was required.
239 This decision 
is an unambiguous exercise in minimalism at war. 
5. What kind of authorization? A general emphasis on the need for congressional 
authorization hardly answers all questions about the relationship between statutory 
provisions and presidential power.
240 We can group the cases discussed thus far into three 
categories. Sometimes Congress is required to authorize; the President cannot act without 
some grant of power from the national legislature. Sometimes Congress is required to 
authorize clearly; in the face of ambiguity, the President is not permitted to engage in a 
certain course of conduct. Sometimes Congress is required to authorize both clearly and 
specifically; without an express grant of authority to act in a specific way, the President is 
powerless. My emphasis has been on the need for clear authorization, which dominates 
the cases on liberty amidst war. But as the discussion thus far should suggest, the other 
categories are relevant as well. 
  When the President has inherent authority to act, legislative authorization is by 
hypothesis irrelevant. If, for example, prompt presidential warmaking is needed to repel a 
sudden attack on the United States, the best reading of the Constitution is that the 
President can take action whether or not Congress has authorized him to do so.
241 But 
suppose that the President merely has a plausible claim of inherent authority to act—and 
that there is a reasonable dispute about whether that authority actually exists. In such 
cases, the minimalist route is to require congressional authorization, and to find such 
authorization both necessary and sufficient whether or not it is clear. Because a 
constitutional question would be presented if such authorization were absent, minimalist 
judges reasonably rule that the authorization need not be clear. Indeed, such judges might 
aggressively construe the existing statutory materials to enable the President to do what 
(he plausibly claims) the Constitution enables him to do on his own. Ex Parte Quirin, 
finding authorization that cannot fairly be described as clear,
242 is the most important 
example of this kind of minimalism. 
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49   But compare a case in which the President lacks a strong claim of constitutional 
power and in which some kind of liberty-based objection is mounted against his action. 
Here the proper course is to require a high degree of clarity. Hamdi, Kahanamoku, 
Masses, and Yates comfortably fall in this category. And where the liberty-based 
objection is especially strong, both clarity and specificity should be required. The 
difference between the two is usually unimportant, because clarity is usually absent 
without specificity. But we can see the relevance of the distinction in the disagreement 
between the plurality and Justice Souter in Hamdi. Justice Souter would have required 
specificity in the form of an express grant of authority to detain. By contrast, the plurality 
was satisfied with the general authorization for the use of force, which seemed relatively 
clear in light of historical understandings.
243 I will return to this dispute shortly. Note in 
this regard that Kent v Dulles is the strongest precedent for the view that congressional 
authorization must be both clear and specific; and Ex Parte Endo speaks in similar terms. 
The most sensible orienting point here is that the demand for specificity grows with the 
magnitude of the intrusion on liberty—a claim that will shortly bring us to the second 
component of minimalism at war.  
 6.  On the necessity and sufficiency of congressional authorization. Under the law 
as I have reconstructed it here, congressional authorization is ordinarily both a necessary 
and a sufficient condition for presidential intrusions into the domain of constitutionally 
sensitive interests. I have also noted that in some areas, such authorization is not 
necessary. And many civil libertarians will argue that in many areas, such authorization is 
not sufficient. They will fear that in times of genuine crisis, Congress is likely to do 
whatever the President wants; and if the stakes are high enough, it will do so fairly 
automatically, capitulating to his will. Isn’t it better, and in a sense more minimalist, to 
say that while congressional authorization is often sufficient, it should not always be, and 
that question must be resolved on a case-by-case basis rather than categorically? 
  A committed minimalist would be tempted to answer this question with an 
enthusiastic “Yes.” In fact I have already suggested that congressional authorization is 
sometimes insufficient. Even if Congress and the President agree to silence political 
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50 dissent during war, the first amendment should stand in their way; and for reasons to be 
discussed shortly, fair hearings should generally be required even if the democratic 
branches want to dispense with them. But committed minimalists should also agree that 
outside of the egregious cases, and when Congress and the President have settled on a 
certain course of action, courts should be reluctant to rule against them. At the very least, 
American history attests to the likelihood that courts will follow this path when the stakes 
are high. Of course we can imagine clear constitutional violations, even outrages, in 
which we might expect, and certainly hope for, a degree of judicial courage.
244 
Unfortunately, national experience testifies to the existence and future likelihood of such 
violations. The jury remains out, so to speak, on the likelihood of future judicial courage. 
What I am emphasizing here is that congressional authorization should be seen as the first 
line of defense against intrusions into the domain of constitutionally sensitive interests.  
 
B. Minimally Fair Procedures 
 
  In one of the wisest and most important pronouncements in the history of 
American law, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, “The history of liberty has largely been 
the history of the observance of procedural safeguards.”
245 A primary component of the 
minimalist program is to take this pronouncement extremely seriously, by requiring, 
where the legal materials are ambiguous, some kind of hearing for those who are 
deprived of their liberty.  
Indeed, many of the cases explored thus far are centrally concerned with 
procedural safeguards. The clearest statement along these lines is found in Duncan v 
Kahanamoku, the martial law case from Hawaii, in which the Court narrowly construed 
the Hawaiian Organic Act so as to ensure that civilians would receive access to ordinary 
courts.
246 There the Court offered a ringing endorsement of “procedural safeguards,” 
describing them as “indispensable to our system of government” and as ensuring checks 
on executive absolutism.
247 Ex Parte Endo is best read in this general spirit. So too, Chief 
                                                 
244 See Stone, Perilous Times (cited in note 14).  
245 McNabb v United States, 318 US 332, 347 (1943). 
246 327 US 304 (1945). 
247 Id at 322. 
51 Justice Taney’s rejection of President Lincoln’s claim of authority to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus endorses this aspect of minimalism at war. 
The requirement of a hearing before people can lose their liberty deserves firm 
judicial support even when national security is at risk. Of course a general proposition of 
this kind does not resolve all cases; if people have been captured on the battlefield and 
are held beyond the territorial jurisdiction of American courts, then judges are powerless 
to intervene.
248 But if the legal materials can fairly be interpreted to require procedural 
protection, they should be so interpreted. And indeed this idea has received ringing 
endorsement in recent Supreme Court decisions involving the war on terrorism. Of these 
the more elaborately reasoned was the plurality opinion in Hamdi v Rumsfeld,
249 
mentioned above; it is now time to explore that ruling in more detail.  
Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen born in Louisiana, was seized by 
members of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. From there he was transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay, then to a naval brig in Norfolk Virginia, and then to a brig in 
Charleston, South Carolina. According to the United States government, Hamdi qualified 
as an “enemy combatant” and hence could be held indefinitely without formal 
proceedings of any kind. The government urged that Hamdi had become affiliated with a 
Taliban military unit, received weapons training, and had an assault rifle with him at the 
time that he surrendered to the Northern Alliance. 
  The initial question was whether the executive had been authorized to detain 
citizens who qualify as “enemy combatants.” This was an unusually complex question, 
for the government argued that even if Congress had not so authorized the executive, the 
executive “possesses plenary power to detain pursuant to Article II of the 
Constitution.”
250 As I have noted, the plurality avoided the constitutional question by 
holding that Congress had authorized presidential detentions. The plurality pointed to the 
language of the authorization for the use of military force, which gives the President the 
authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or 
persons” associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The plurality 
concluded that the detention of “enemy combatants,” at least for the duration of the 
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52 conflict in which the capture occurred, “is so fundamental and accepted an incident to 
war as to be” an authorized exercise of “necessary and appropriate force.”
251 
  This was not an inevitable conclusion. As I have noted, Justice Souter contended 
that an explicit legislative statement should be required and that no such statement could 
be found. The plurality responded, plausibly, that detention to prevent return to the 
battlefield “is a fundamental incident of war.” But we have also seen that the plurality 
rejected the government’s claim that Congress had authorized indefinite detention by the 
executive. In its view, the “detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”
252 As a 
matter of statutory interpretation, the plurality said that Congress’ grant of authority to 
use force included the power to detain only for the duration of the relevant conflict. In 
good minimalist fashion, the plurality acknowledged that this “understanding may 
unravel” if “the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the 
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war.”
253 But this “is not the 
situation we face as of this date.”
254 
  Having found that the detention of Hamdi was authorized, at least for the duration 
of the conflict, the plurality turned to the question of due process. The government 
contended that because Hamdi was seized in a combat zone, no factfinding was 
necessary. The plurality disagreed. For Hamdi to be lawfully detained, he would have to 
have been part of armed forces engaged in conflict against the United States. This 
question was disputed and the conclusion of the executive would not be enough. The 
government also argued that no individual procedure was justified “in light of the 
extraordinary constitutional interests at stake”—or at most, that the court should ask 
whether “some evidence” supported the executive’s determination that a citizen is an 
enemy combatant.
255 The plurality disagreed here as well. In the key passage, the 
plurality said that an enemy combatant must be supplied with “notice of the factual basis 
                                                 
251 Id at 2640. 
252 Id at 2642. 
253 Id at 2641. 
254 Id at 2642. 
255 Id at 2645. 
53 for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker.”
256  
The plurality acknowledged the possibility that the constitutional requirements 
could be met before a military tribunal.
257 What was necessary was not any particular set 
of procedures, but a process that offers both notice and a chance to be heard. “We 
anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that we have indicated is 
necessary in this setting, engaging in a factfinding process that is both prudent and 
incremental.”
258 
  What is noteworthy about the plurality’s reasoning is its insistence on the right to 
a fair hearing before a deprivation of freedom, which is called one of the “essential 
liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”
259 Minimalists 
emphasize that right above all others. Of all the opinions in the Court’s terrorism cases, 
the clearest endorsement of this point can be found in Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion 
in Padilla, where he wrote that “[u]nconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of 
investigating and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber,” 
and added that the ability to retain “counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen from 
official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due process,” even when the nation 
is attempting “to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.”
260 In so saying, Justice 
Stevens was writing in the same spirit as the Court’s majority, which has yet to question 
the general requirement of fair hearings.
261 
  Of course that requirement has exceptions. Good minimalists cannot claim that 
hearings are always required; the very endorsement of hearing rights is, in its way, a 
departure from the minimalist reluctance to rule widely. As the Court said in Rasul, 
“there is a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judicial power may 
not enter.”
262 If an enemy combatant is being held for a specific period in an area outside 
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54 the territorial control of the United States, federal courts may not intervene.
263 It is clear 
that as Commander in Chief, the President can authorize the capture and detention of 
enemy combatants for specified periods of time, free from federal judicial oversight. But 
even in such situations, American courts have been careful to reject indefinite detention 
without trial, and have looked to ensure that some kind of procedure was available to 
reduce the risk of error.
264 In times of war, minimalist judges are reluctant to impose 
sharp constraints on the executive. But they are less reluctant to intervene when they are 
being asked to ensure against arbitrary or mistaken deprivations of liberty.  
 
C. Narrow and Incompletely Theorized Rulings 
 
  Thus far my emphasis has been on the need to restrain executive power. But there 
is also a need for courts to restrain themselves. In the context of war, minimalists endorse 
narrow, incompletely theorized rulings in order to promote two goals. First, judges ought 
to avoid excessive intrusions into the executive domain. Minimalist rulings help to ensure 
against judicial overreaching. Second, judges ought to avoid setting precedents that will, 
in retrospect, appear to give excessive authority to the President.
265 Minimalist rulings 
help to ensure against that risk as well. 
  Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in The Steel Seizure Case offers the most 
elaborate discussion of the basic point.
266 He emphasized that “[r]igorous adherence to 
the narrow scope of the judicial function” is especially important in constitutional cases 
when national security is at risk, notwithstanding the national “eagerness to settle—
preferably forever—a specific problem on the basis of the broadest possible 
constitutional pronouncement.”
267 In his view, the Court’s duty “lies in the opposite 
direction,” through judgments that make it unnecessary to consider “delicate problems of 
power under the Constitution.”
268 Thus the Court has an obligation “to avoid putting 
fetters upon the future by needless pronouncements today.”
269 Thus he would have ruled, 
very narrowly, that the President had been deprived, by Congress, of the authority to 
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55 engage in the seizure of the steel mills—a ruling that would have said exceedingly little 
about the hardest constitutional questions.
270 
  We have already encountered a number of illustrations of analogous forms of 
judicial self-discipline. The ruling in Kent v Dulles left the largest constitutional 
questions for another day. So too, the concurring justices in Ex Parte Milligan argued 
against a broad ruling on individual rights. In the same vein, Ex Parte Quirin, 
emphasizing congressional authorization, was a narrow ruling, simply because it left so 
much in legislative hands. In Masses, Judge Hand did not hold that Congress lacked the 
constitutional power to punish the relevant speech; he ruled more modestly that Congress 
had not seen fit to exercise whatever power it might have. The Supreme Court followed 
precisely the same approach in Yates. 
The same tendency toward minimalist rulings was on fine display in 2004. In 
Rasul v Bush,
271 the Court was asked to say whether federal courts have jurisdiction to 
consider the detentions of foreign nationals captured and incarcerated at Guantanamo 
Bay. The Court chose to restrict itself to two exceedingly narrow questions. It held only 
that the federal habeas statute granted jurisdiction to federal courts to hear challenges by 
foreign nationals to their detentions, and that the Alien Tort Statute did not bar federal 
jurisdiction.
272 Having reached these conclusions, the Court said almost nothing else: 
“Whether and what proceedings may become necessary after respondents make their 
response to the merits of petitioners’ claims are matters that we need not address now. 
What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to 
determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals 
who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.”
273 
  We might compare the majority’s approach here with the maximalist approaches 
of Justices Scalia and Thomas. Characteristically, Justice Scalia produced two opinions 
that were both deep and wide. In Hamdi, he argued that unless Congress has suspended 
the writ of habeas corpus, an American citizen is entitled to challenge his imprisonment 
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56 and to obtain release unless and until criminal proceedings are brought.
274 The 
implication here is large: The President of the United States may not detain American 
citizens indefinitely, even if they are captured on the battlefield, unless the writ of habeas 
corpus has been suspended. “Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper that 
liberty give way to security in times of national crisis . . . Whatever the general merits of 
the view that war silences law or modulates its voice, that view has no place in the 
interpretation and application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in 
a manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.”
275 Suspension of 
habeas corpus, or an ordinary trial-type hearing, is the rule for American citizens.  
Justice Scalia’s preference for a maximalist ruling fits well with one of his 
strongest argument on behalf of wide rather than narrow decisions: Width works not only 
to constrain judges but also to embolden them. “The chances that frail men and women 
will stand up to their unpleasant duty are greatly increased if they can stand behind the 
solid shield of a firm, clear principle enunciated in earlier cases.”
276  
Justice Scalia urges a different but similarly wide rule for foreign nationals 
detained overseas by the United States military.
277 Here his rule is also clear: The federal 
habeas corpus statute does not apply at all, and the President can detain people free from 
judicial oversight. Thus Justice Scalia rejects the Court’s conclusion that some kind of 
hearing is necessary to support detention. “For this Court to create such a monstrous 
scheme in time of war, and in frustration of our military commanders’ reliance upon 
clearly stated prior law, is judicial adventurism of the worst sort.”
278 Justice Thomas 
joined Justice Scalia on the point; and as we have seen, he also favors a broad rule for 
American citizens, permitting the President to detain enemy combatants indefinitely. For 
present purposes, what is noteworthy about the Scalia and Thomas opinions is that they 
favor both width and depth. Justice Thomas is quite explicit on this point, objecting 
specifically to the Court’s use of a “balancing scheme” and responding, “I do not think 
that the Federal Government’s war powers can be balanced away by this Court.”
279 
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57 Of course civil libertarians are likely to approve of Justice Scalia’s approach in 
Hamdi and to reject that of Justices Scalia and Thomas in Rasul. But as Justice Thomas 
points out, Justice Scalia’s liberty-protecting position in Hamdi creates risks simply 
because of its breadth.
280 If Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas were clearly right on the 
law, then no one could object to their plea for depth and width. But suppose that the law 
is not clear and that a deep or wide ruling might be confounded by unanticipated 
circumstances. If so, there is every reason for federal judges to issue shallow and narrow 
opinions, refusing to freeze the future and allowing decisions to turn on particular 
circumstances. Indeed, the Court’s very refusal to decide the Padilla case on the merits, 
relying instead on a jurisdictional objection, can be understood as an extreme example of 
an insistence on shallowness and narrowness
281; and if the underlying issues are 
extremely complex, then it is not hard to understand the Court’s reluctance to resolve 
them.
282  
At this point it would be possible to object that narrow decisions, stressing 
particular facts, are in a sense more intrusive than those that offer greater width and 
depth. The reason is that narrow decisions leave the executive, and other institutions, so 
unclear about what they are supposed to do. This is a significant and legitimate concern 
about Rasul in particular. I have emphasized that that decision is highly minimalist, 
holding only that on these particular facts, these detainees are entitled to hearings. But 
this ruling leaves the government with very little guidance. Are those held at an air force 
base in Afghanistan or Iraq entitled to hearings? Does it matter if they are only being held 
for a few weeks, while the government explores the relevant facts, obtains a translator, 
and so forth? Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion appears responsive to the 
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58 government’s need for a measure of clarity.
283 If the Court leaves too much undecided, 
the government will have to proceed in the dark, in a way that might lead to a range of 
problems.  
As evidence, consider here the distinctive problems that have emerged in the 
aftermath of Rasul. In December 2004, a federal district court “served as the stage for the 
beginning of what [was] expected to be a long and bruising second phase of the legal 
battle” over the fate of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.
284 The adnministration argued for a 
narrow reading of Rasul, one that would be satisfied by a hearing at the naval base in 
which detainees were permitted to argue that they were not properly characterized as 
enemy combatants.
285 By contrast, the detainees contended that they were entitled to a 
lawyer and to an opportunity to see the evidence against them.
286 Because the Supreme 
Court did not resolve this dispute, protracted litigation was inevitable. In this light, it is 
reasonable to worry whether narrowness might not create unnecessary and even 
damaging uncertainty. 
The concern is justified, and for some problems, it offers a good reason for a 
degree of width; but that reason is only one of a set of relevant considerations, many of 
them pointing toward narrow rulings in the context of war. If judges can be confident 
about a wider ruling, then they should issue it. By doing so, they reduce uncertainty, and 
they do so (by hypothesis) without compromising other important values. But if judges 
lack confidence in a wider ruling, the costs of uncertainty may be worth incurring. The 
argument in Rasul involved the narrow questions the Court decided, not the broader ones 
that have arisen in the aftermath of its decision. The most that can be said is that 
government’s need for planning provides a cautionary note about narrow and shallow 
rulings -- suggesting the need to be minimalist, so to speak, about minimalism itself. But 
I hope that I have said enough to show that during war, a minimalist posture, of the sort 
defined by the three principles, provides the best general orientation.  
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59  
Conclusion 
 
  I have attempted to outline and to evaluate three general approaches to conflicts 
among civil liberty and national security: Liberty Maximalism, National Security 
Maximalism, and minimalism. Courts are most unlikely to adopt Liberty Maximalism, 
and for good reason. The extent of liberty depends, in large part, on the strength and the 
legitimacy of the reasons for intruding on it, and when national security is genuinely at 
risk, the legitimate reasons for intruding on liberty are stronger. Of course courts should 
strike down indefensible restrictions on constitutional rights, above all freedom of 
speech.
287 But where the founding document leaves gaps and ambiguities, judicial 
caution is entirely appropriate amidst war.  
By contrast, National Security Maximalism might seem highly attractive to 
reviewing courts, and there are strong arguments on its behalf. More than anyone else, 
the President is in a strong position to protect the country, because he is uniquely well- 
equipped to acquire relevant information, and because he can act both in a coordinated 
way and with dispatch. These points are closing connected with central ideas about the 
executive branch in the founding era.
288 For their part, judges lack the information that 
would permit them to make sensible judgments about when an intrusion on liberty is 
justified, and the costs of judicial errors in the direction of liberty may turn out to be 
catastrophic. Notably, National Security Maximalism has received some strong 
endorsements on federal courts of appeals amidst the war on terrorism.  
Notwithstanding its attractions, National Security Maximalism cannot claim much 
support in the Constitution itself. The founding document carefully divides authority 
between the President and Congress. It does not give a general “war power” to the 
President. With respect to war, the Constitution is easily read to give the national 
legislation the primary role. In addition, National Security Maximalism neglects 
institutional factors that create a grave risk that the executive branch will support 
unjustified intrusions on civil liberties. Group polarization is a significant danger, 
particularly for a branch specifically designed to consist of like-minded people. As a 
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60 result, the executive might well support interferences with freedom that are not 
adequately justified by security concerns. This is especially likely if those interferences 
affect identifiable groups rather than the public as a whole.  
In the face of the relevant risks, the best general orientation is a particular form of 
minimalism, with its three principal requirements, representing a kind of Due Process 
Writ Large. First, Congress should be required to provide clear authorization for 
executive intrusions on interests that have a strong claim to constitutional protection. 
Second, some kind of hearing should be required before the executive deprives people of 
their freedom. Third, courts should discipline themselves through narrow, incompletely 
theorized rulings. To a remarkable degree, these three ideas capture the practices of the 
Supreme Court in dealing with claimed violations of constitutional rights when national 
security has been threatened. Minimalism can find prominent endorsement during the 
Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and the contemporary war on 
terrorism.  
In numerous cases, the Court, and its most celebrated members, have adopted a 
form of minimalism in war. To be sure, minimalist decisions are unlikely to do all that 
should be done to prevent unjustified intrusions into the domain of liberty. But such 
decisions have the significant advantage of carving out a role that is admirably well-
suited to the institutional strengths and weaknesses of the federal judiciary.  
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